574 F.Supp.3d 558
M.D. Tenn.2021Background:
- Nine consolidated cases brought by John Does #1–#9 challenge Tennessee's retroactive application of its Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Monitoring Act to offenses committed before the registry scheme existed.
- Sixth Circuit precedent in Does #1–5 v. Snyder held a similar Michigan scheme unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause; multiple Tennessee district courts have applied or found Snyder persuasive for Tennessee’s scheme.
- Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the registry against them; defendants opposed, citing public safety and risk of reoffense.
- The court found Does #1–#8 likely to succeed on the merits, irreparably harmed by continued application of the registry, and that the public interest favors protecting constitutional rights; preliminary injunctive relief was granted for Does #1–#8.
- Relief for Doe #9 was denied without prejudice because he is not currently a Tennessee resident and questions about standing and the effect of the registry on him remain pending alongside a Motion to Dismiss.
- The court ordered defendants to stop enforcing the Act against Does #1–#8 and to take steps to remove them from the Tennessee registry; no bond was required.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactive application of Tennessee registry violates Ex Post Facto Clause | Retroactive imposition of registry and its burdens are punitive and unlawful under Snyder | State argues registry serves public safety and is lawful as applied | Court: Likely unconstitutional as applied to Does whose offenses predate scheme; favors plaintiffs #1–#8 |
| Likelihood of success on the merits for named plaintiffs | Snyder controls; scheme is substantially similar and punitive on its face | State disputes applicability and emphasizes individual variation and public-safety rationale | Court: High likelihood of success for Does #1–#8; applies Ex Post Facto analysis without deep individualized inquiry |
| Irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest | Constitutional violation and non-monetary harms (stigma, restrictions) justify injunction; public interest favors upholding rights | State stresses need to protect public from recidivism; argues registrants pose risk | Court: Irreparable harm presumed for constitutional injury; equities and public interest favor injunction for Does #1–#8 |
| Standing and current harm (Doe #9) | Doe #9 asserts continued placement on Tennessee registry and desire to return to Tennessee; seeks same relief | State contends Doe #9 is not a Tennessee resident and lacks present concrete injury; challenges standing | Court: Denies relief to Doe #9 without prejudice due to residency/standing uncertainties and pending Motion to Dismiss |
Key Cases Cited
- Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (binding Sixth Circuit precedent finding a similar retroactive registry scheme unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause)
- Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (focuses Ex Post Facto analysis on the punitive character of a statute on its face rather than individualized effects)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (discusses limits on retroactive civil regulatory schemes and the distinction between civil regulation and punishment)
- D.T. v. Sumner Cty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2019) (sets forth the four-factor preliminary injunction framework applied here)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (explains that harm to others and public interest merge when the government is the opposing party)
- Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (presumption of irreparable injury when a constitutional right is threatened)