Doe v. Washington State Patrol
374 P.3d 63
Wash.
2016

Background

  • Donna Zink submitted PRA requests to the Washington State Patrol (WSP) and WASPC for records relating to level I registered sex offenders; both agencies intended to disclose the records.
  • WASPC notified affected level I offenders (John Does) before release; the John Does sued to enjoin blanket disclosure and obtained a trial-court injunction and declaratory judgment that RCW 4.24.550 provides the exclusive mechanism for public disclosure.
  • The central statutory text at issue was RCW 4.24.550(3)(a), which (as of the time of the requests) allowed agencies to “may disclose, upon request” certain information about level I offenders to limited categories of individuals.
  • Lower court held RCW 4.24.550 was an "other statute" under the PRA (RCW 42.56.070(1)) and thus exempted blanket PRA disclosure of level I registration information.
  • The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and reversed: it held RCW 4.24.550(3)(a) is permissive and does not explicitly exempt records from PRA disclosure; level I registration records are therefore subject to PRA requests.
  • The Court also denied Zink’s claim for attorney fees/penalties because she prevailed against private parties, not against an agency (so RCW 42.56.550(4) fees/penalties do not apply).

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (John Does) Defendant's Argument (Zink/WSP/WASPC) Held
Whether RCW 4.24.550(3)(a) is an "other statute" under RCW 42.56.070(1) that exempts blanket PRA disclosure of level I records The statute’s “upon request” language and its scheme restricting public disclosure show legislative intent to make RCW 4.24.550 the exclusive mechanism for obtaining these records The statute is permissive, contains no prohibitory or confidentiality language, and subsection (9) states nothing in the section implies confidentiality; thus it does not exempt records from the PRA Court held RCW 4.24.550(3)(a) is not an "other statute"; level I registration records are subject to PRA requests
Whether the PRA exemption can be implied where statute lacks explicit nondisclosure language John Does: reading must give effect to RCW 4.24.550’s limits and purpose; PRA shouldn’t nullify that scheme Zink/WSP: PRA presumes disclosure and exemptions must be explicit; courts must not infer broad exemptions Court held exemptions must be explicit; it will not imply an "other statute" exemption from the CPA’s permissive language
Whether RCW 4.24.550(9) ("nothing in this section implies... confidential") means records remain nonconfidential under PRA John Does: clause can be read in context to preserve limits on disclosure Zink/WSP: subsection (9) disclaims confidentiality and supports disclosure under PRA Court agreed with Zink/WSP: subsection (9) disclaims confidentiality in general terms and supports PRA disclosure; it does not convert the CPA into an explicit PRA exemption
Whether Zink is entitled to attorney fees, costs, or per diem penalties under RCW 42.56.550(4) Zink: she prevailed; thus she should receive statutory fees and penalties WSP/WASPC: agencies supported disclosure, so Zink did not "prevail against an agency" as required by the statute Court denied fees/penalties: Zink prevailed against private parties (John Does), not against an agency, so fees/penalties under the PRA do not apply

Key Cases Cited

  • Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wn.2d 734 (Wash. 1998) (requester not entitled to PRA fees where agency supported disclosure and injunction issued by private parties)
  • Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d 439 (Wash. 2004) (statute protecting attorney-client communications treated as an "other statute")
  • Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of the Attorney General, 170 Wn.2d 418 (Wash. 2010) (federal statute found to be an "other statute" exempting certain information)
  • Fisher Broadcasting–Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515 (Wash. 2014) (dashboard-camera recording statute held to be an "other statute")
  • Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243 (Wash. 1994) (PAWS II) (courts will not imply broad PRA exemptions; "other statute" exemption must be explicit)
  • In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606 (Wash. 1986) (court-crafted personal privacy exemption prompted legislative clarification)
  • Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (sex-offender registry statute held nonpunitive for ex post facto purposes)
  • Spokane Police Guild v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wn.2d 30 (Wash. 1989) (PRA presumption of disclosure; agency duty to disclose)
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