905 F.3d 1038
7th Cir.2018Background
- Jane Doe alleged that Vigo County employee David Gray confined and sexually assaulted her while she was performing court-ordered community-service volunteering at a county park; Gray pleaded guilty to criminal confinement and official misconduct.
- Gray worked as a parks maintenance specialist who cleaned restrooms, directed volunteers, and signed community-service logs; he worked with substantial autonomy and sometimes alone.
- Doe sued Gray and Vigo County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell claim) and state-law tort theories including negligent retention/supervision and vicarious liability. Gray defaulted; the district court granted summary judgment for Vigo County and entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). Doe appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether material facts could support municipal liability under state respondeat superior principles, a non-delegable/common-carrier duty theory, Monell (custom/practice and deliberate indifference), and Indiana negligent-retention/supervision standards.
- The record showed a handful of prior county employee misconduct incidents over ~20 years (some sexual harassment or inappropriate conduct), two prior non-substantiated/sanctioned incidents involving Gray (vague complaint; written reprimand), and evidence the County investigated and disciplined employees (reprimands, resignations, terminations, prosecutions).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) under Indiana law | County is liable for Gray's torts because Gray was on the job and had authority over volunteers / access to Doe | Gray's conduct (sexual assault and confinement) was outside the scope of employment; job duties did not authorize intimate contact or confinement | Affirmed for County — no vicarious liability; assault not within scope of employment (Barnett/Konkle distinctions) |
| Non-delegable/common-carrier-type duty | County owed a non-delegable duty to protect Doe while she completed court-ordered service at its park | County did not exercise control analogous to a carrier/home/jailer; Doe was not so restrained or deprived of autonomy | Rejected — argument waived below; merits would not support expanding Indiana law to impose such a duty |
| Monell claim (custom/practice & deliberate indifference) | County had a long-standing custom of tolerating employee sexual misconduct and condoning illicit behavior that caused Doe's injury | Incidents were few and dissimilar over 20 years; County investigated and disciplined offenders; no evidence of deliberate indifference or pattern causing the specific risk | Affirmed for County — no widespread, well-settled custom and no deliberate indifference |
| Negligent retention/supervision under Indiana law | County knew or should have known Gray posed a risk and failed to take adequate steps (retention, supervision, allowing lone work with volunteers) | County investigated, reprimanded, and punished employees; prior conduct did not make Doe's rape a foreseeable type of harm; supervision choices not negligent | Affirmed for County — no sufficient foreseeability or breach to impose liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy/custom causing constitutional violation)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment framework)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (limits on vicarious liability under § 1983)
- Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281 (Ind.) (discussing when employer may be vicariously liable for employee sexual misconduct)
- Stropes v. Heritage House Children's Center, 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind.) (respondeat superior when job duties include intimate physical contact)
- Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App.) (mere access is insufficient; misconduct not similar to job duties)