Doe v. United States, 915 F.3d 905

Background

John Doe pleaded guilty to a one-count conspiracy pursuant to a plea agreement that included cooperation; he later learned the loss amount made the offense an aggravated felony with mandatory removal and bar to naturalization.
Doe’s defense counsel assured him the plea would not lead to deportation; counsel later admitted ignorance of immigration law and reliance on government assurances.
After sentencing Doe applied to renew his green card, was placed in removal proceedings (administratively closed), then was denied naturalization; government agents encouraged him to delay vacatur efforts.
Doe filed a coram nobis petition to vacate his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (misadvice about immigration consequences); the Government initially opposed, then joined his petition, but the district court denied relief.
The Second Circuit remanded for explanation; the district court issued a written opinion applying an incorrect legal standard and again denied the writ.
On appeal the Second Circuit held counsel’s affirmative misadvice was objectively unreasonable, found Doe suffered Strickland prejudice, concluded Doe had sound reasons for delay, and reversed to vacate plea and conviction and ordered transfer of the criminal case.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether coram nobis was available and the district court applied correct standards	Doe: coram nobis proper; ineffective assistance (immigration misadvice) compels relief and he continues to suffer immigration consequences	Govt: initially opposed timeliness and prejudice; later conceded ineffective assistance but on appeal argued no abuse of discretion by district court	Court: district court applied wrong test; coram nobis standards govern and Doe met them; relief granted
Whether counsel’s affirmative misadvice was objectively unreasonable	Doe: counsel told him plea would not result in deportation, despite lack of immigration-law expertise	Govt: conceded below that counsel’s conduct was unreasonable; later contested some implications	Court: counsel’s representations were objectively unreasonable (Couto standard)
Whether Doe was prejudiced under Strickland (would have pleaded/tried differently)	Doe: would have sought different plea or litigated loss/charges; deeply concerned about deportation; contemporaneous evidence supports this	Govt: argued overwhelming case, no identified alternative charge or sure way to avoid >$10,000 loss finding	Court: prejudice shown—reasonable probability of a plea without immigration effect or of litigating defenses/loss amount; Doe would likely have pursued alternatives
Whether Doe provided sound reasons for delay in filing coram nobis	Doe: agents repeatedly told him they would secure citizenship or vacatur, discouraging timely filing; filed promptly once he learned otherwise	Govt: questioned gaps in timeline and delay length	Court: Doe provided sufficient, justified reasons for delay; petition timely under coram nobis standards

Key Cases Cited

Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014) (sets coram nobis standards and prejudice inquiry)
Morgan v. United States, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (coram nobis is extraordinary remedy)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel must advise regarding immigration consequences; context for ineffective-assistance jurisprudence)
United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirmative misrepresentation about deportation is objectively unreasonable)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (contemporaneous evidence required to support claim that deportation concerns affected plea decision)
United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 1995) (principles for attributing loss in conspiracy cases)
Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1996) (elements for coram nobis relief)
United States v. Gonzales, 884 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2018) (importance of immigration consequences to defendant’s plea decision)