555 F.Supp.3d 889
N.D. Cal.2021Background:
- Two plaintiffs allege they were sex‑trafficked as minors and coerced into making pornographic videos on Snapchat; later the videos were posted on Twitter and received large numbers of views and retweets.
- Plaintiffs and their mother repeatedly reported the material to Twitter (including proof of age and descriptions of coercion); Twitter initially declined to remove the links and only took them down after a Department of Homeland Security agent intervened; removal occurred nine days after initial notice.
- Plaintiffs sued Twitter asserting federal claims (TVPRA §1591/§1595 direct and beneficiary liability; duties to report; civil remedies under §2252A and §2255) and multiple California state tort and statutory claims (products‑liability/design defect, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, privacy torts, Cal. Civ. Code §1708.85, and UCL violations).
- Twitter moved to dismiss on Section 230 immunity grounds and, alternatively, for failure to state many of the claims; Twitter urged FOSTA (2018 amendment) creates only a narrow carve‑out and that Plaintiffs failed to plead the mens rea, venture participation, or that Twitter received a benefit tied to trafficking.
- The court held Twitter is immune under Section 230 for most claims but denied dismissal as to Plaintiffs’ TVPRA beneficiary liability claim (Claim Two), concluding that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded participation in a venture, that Twitter received a benefit, and that Twitter knew or should have known of the trafficking; all remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1591(a)(1) (direct sex trafficking) was pleaded | The verbs “provide/obtain/maintain” cover making minors available via online videos; Twitter’s hosting qualifies as conduct under §1591(a)(1) | The statutory verbs refer to acts against a person, not to a depiction (video); Plaintiffs did not plead solicitation or acting against a person | Dismissed — plaintiffs failed to state a §1591(a)(1) claim |
| Whether beneficiary liability under §1591(a)(2)/civil remedy §1595 was pleaded and whether FOSTA removes §230 immunity for it | FOSTA carved out TVPRA civil claims; Plaintiffs alleged (1) participation in a venture (ongoing patterns, Twitter ignored reports), (2) Twitter knowingly received benefit from the views/monetization, and (3) Twitter knew or should have known plaintiffs were trafficked | Twitter: FOSTA limited to narrow, criminal‑level conduct; civil plaintiffs must plead criminal mens rea, overt acts, and a close venture relationship; §230 still bars claims here | Denied as to beneficiary claim — court found plaintiffs plausibly alleged participation, benefit, and that FOSTA exempts this civil claim from §230 immunity |
| Whether duties to report under 18 U.S.C. §§2258A/2258B create a private cause of action | Plaintiffs: statutory duties and §2258B standards support civil enforcement and inform negligence duties | Twitter: §2258A imposes criminal fines but does not create a private civil remedy; §2258B is a safe harbor for good‑faith reporting | Dismissed — no private right of action under §2258A; claim fails on pleading grounds (court did not reach §230) |
| Whether claims based on child‑pornography statutes (§2252A/§2255) and state torts/statutes survive §230 | Plaintiffs: §230 should not immunize platforms for knowingly possessing/distributing contraband CSAM; state claims and §2255 provide remedies | Twitter: §230 bars suits treating the platform as publisher; FOSTA only exempts §1595/§1591 claims; other federal and state claims remain barred | Dismissed — court held §230 bars civil claims under §2252A/§2255 and most state claims (products‑liability, negligence, privacy torts, §1708.85, UCL); only the §1595 beneficiary claim survives |
Key Cases Cited
- Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2019) (background on §230 purpose and Good Samaritan immunity)
- Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (defining information content provider and limits of §230)
- Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (§230 immunity covers decisions to remove or publish third‑party content)
- Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusal to impose liability on intermediaries for third‑party misconduct despite serious harm)
- Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (§230 immunizes providers even after notice of harmful third‑party content)
- Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) (products‑liability theory that does not treat defendant as publisher can escape §230)
- M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (civil §1595 claims require a different, less stringent knowledge/participation standard than criminal §1591)
- Doe v. Kik Interactive, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (construed FOSTA narrowly and required criminal‑level §1591 standards to defeat §230 for ICS defendants)
- United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) (criminal §1591 can cover procurement via electronic means)
- Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021) (policy reasons for broad §230 immunity to avoid chilling intermediaries)
- Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (discussed causal link and benefit requirements for §1591(a)(2) liability)