Doe v. Town of W. Hartford
147 A.3d 1083
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff (John Doe) sued multiple defendants (town, medical, hospital actors) for alleged misconduct occurring May 22–June 8, 2007; suit filed May 19, 2010; marshal’s return shows service June 9, 2010.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment more than three years after filing, arguing the claims were time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations.
- Plaintiff invoked General Statutes § 52-593a (saving statute), asserting process was delivered to State Marshal John Griffin on May 20, 2010, thereby saving claims despite actual service being June 9, 2010.
- Plaintiff submitted Griffin’s affidavit and Attorney A. Paul Spinella’s affidavit and deposition; the court struck Griffin’s affidavit and partially struck Spinella’s affidavit, then granted summary judgment for defendants.
- Plaintiff moved to disqualify Judge Sheridan for alleged bias; Judge Dubay denied the motion after a hearing. Plaintiff appealed both the summary judgment and denial of disqualification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether process was delivered to the marshal within the limitations period (so § 52-593a applies) | Spinella’s deposition and affidavits (and Griffin’s affidavit) create an issue of fact that Griffin picked up process May 20, 2010, so claims are saved | Movants argued no evidence marshal received process before limitations expired; marshal’s return is silent and affidavits lack personal knowledge | Reversed summary judgment: Spinella’s deposition testimony (even without affidavits) created a genuine issue of material fact whether delivery occurred May 20, 2010, so § 52-593a could apply |
| Whether the marshal’s failure to endorse the date on the return (§ 52-593a(b)) is a jurisdictional, fatal defect | Plaintiff: silence on the return does not preclude other proof of timely delivery | Town argued that silence on return is fatal and § 52-593a(b) is mandatory | Rejected town’s alternate ground: prior precedent holds § 52-593a(b) is directory, not mandatory, so silence is not automatically fatal |
| Whether the trial court properly struck Spinella’s affidavit and Griffin’s affidavit for lack of personal knowledge | Plaintiff: affidavits (and deposition) suffice to raise factual dispute | Defendants: affidavits rest on hearsay or lack firsthand knowledge; deposition undermines affidavits | Court of Appeals held that even if affidavits were struck, Spinella’s deposition alone raised a genuine factual issue; court therefore erred to enter summary judgment |
| Whether Judge Sheridan should have been disqualified for bias or prior relationship with defense counsel | Plaintiff: Sheridan’s prior legislative testimony and brief stint as Manchester town attorney show bias or a disqualifying attorney-client/master-servant relationship with defense counsel | Defendants: plaintiff waived or failed to prove bias or any disqualifying relationship; quotes were taken out of context | Affirmed denial of disqualification: objective review showed no demonstrated bias and no evidence of the alleged attorney-client/master-servant relationship |
Key Cases Cited
- Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 (2011) (summary judgment standards and plenary appellate review)
- Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304 (2013) (summary judgment appropriate on statute of limitations where material facts are undisputed)
- Dickerson v. Pincus, 154 Conn. App. 146 (2014) (§ 52-593a(b) is directory; marshal’s omission of delivery date on return is not automatically fatal)
- Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspapers Publishing Co., 136 Conn. App. 67 (2011) (a plaintiff relying on a saving statute must demonstrate compliance; absence of proof marshal received process is fatal)