DOE v. THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH U.S.A. OF TULSA
421 P.3d 284
| Okla. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff (Doe), a Syrian-born Muslim seeking conversion, consented to baptism by First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa (FPC) but expressly refused church membership and requested confidentiality because disclosure could endanger him.
- A church member told Doe the baptism would be handled privately; Doe was baptized in a non-televised service.
- The day after baptism, FPC published notice of the baptism on the internet. Subsequently, Doe was kidnapped in Syria and alleges his captors learned of his conversion from that internet posting; he claims physical and emotional injuries and brings tort and breach‑of‑contract claims.
- The district court granted defendants’ second motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding resolution would require inquiry into ecclesiastical matters and that publication was within church practice.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court (majority) reversed and remanded, holding the motion should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment because resolution depends on disputed factual elements (what Doe requested, what defendants promised, and the scope of his consent). The majority ruled church‑autonomy is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar, where consent/membership is in dispute.
- A multi‑justice dissent argued the church autonomy doctrine can bar jurisdiction (distinguishing it from the ministerial exception), and maintained the district court properly dismissed without conversion to summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the church autonomy doctrine to hear Doe’s tort/breach claims | Doe: claims are secular tort/contract disputes about publication and confidentiality; he never consented to church governance so ecclesiastical jurisdiction does not apply | FPC: publishing baptismal names is tied to Presbyterian baptismal practice; First Amendment church‑autonomy prohibits secular courts from intruding | Court: reversed dismissal; jurisdictional challenge converted to summary‑judgment context because disputed factual elements central to the claim exist; church‑autonomy is an affirmative defense here and does not strip subject matter jurisdiction when consent/membership is disputed |
| Whether a motion under 12 O.S. § 2012(b)(1) may be decided on outside evidence without conversion | Doe: when outside evidence addresses elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action, conversion to summary judgment is required | FPC: evidence shows doctrinal practice—courts may consider such evidence when assessing jurisdiction | Court: where outside evidence concerns disputed elements of the plaintiff’s claim, the (b)(1) motion converts to a summary judgment motion; conversion was required because factual disputes are material |
| Role of membership/consent in applying church autonomy | Doe: he never became a member and did not consent to be governed by church judicature — so ecclesiastical protection should not apply | FPC: baptism submission subjects an individual to church requirements even if not a formal member; doctrine governs sacramental practice regardless | Court: emphasized longline precedent tying ecclesiastical jurisdiction to consent/membership; here consent is disputed, so ecclesiastical shield cannot be resolved without factfinding and thus cannot be treated as jurisdictional bar at this stage |
| Whether church autonomy doctrine is a jurisdictional bar or an affirmative defense after Hosanna‑Tabor | Doe: relies on Hosanna‑Tabor and state precedent to argue it is an affirmative defense; courts must decide merits after factual development | FPC / dissent: argue Hosanna‑Tabor addresses the ministerial exception only and does not abrogate the older church autonomy doctrine as a jurisdictional bar | Court: majority follows Hosanna‑Tabor’s reasoning that these doctrines generally operate as defenses (not jurisdictional bars) when membership/consent issues are central and disputed; dissent maintains otherwise and would treat ecclesiastical abstention as jurisdictional |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (establishes early common‑law principle that ecclesiastical tribunals govern those who consent by membership)
- Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (First Amendment protection for church autonomy in matters of faith, doctrine, and government)
- Hosanna‑Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (ministerial exception operates as an affirmative defense to otherwise cognizable claims)
- Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989) (Oklahoma precedent limiting ecclesiastical protection to persons who consented via membership)
- Osage Nation v. Board of Comm’rs of Osage County, 394 P.3d 1224 (Okla. 2017) (rules on converting jurisdictional challenges to summary judgment when outside evidence addresses elements of the cause of action)
- Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002) (church autonomy doctrine applied beyond member disputes; evidence may require conversion depending on context)