Doe v. St. John's Episcopal Parish Day School, Inc.
997 F. Supp. 2d 1279
M.D. Fla.2014Background
- Plaintiff alleges sexual and physical abuse by two church employees (Jon Caridad and James Biggers) between 1971–1975 while he was a minor; he claims traumatic amnesia and did not recall the abuse until 2011.
- Counts I–II: battery/sexual abuse claims against Caridad and Biggers (intentional torts).
- Counts III–VI: claims versus St. John’s Church, St. John’s School, and Episcopal Diocese for respondeat superior (Count III), negligent supervision/retention (Count IV), negligence (Count V), and breach of fiduciary duty (Count VI).
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), principally arguing statutes of limitations bar the claims; Caridad also raised First Amendment and anonymity objections.
- Court followed Florida intermediate appellate precedent limiting the delayed discovery rule; it held intentional-tort claims and the respondeat superior claim survive, while negligence-based claims (Counts IV–VI) are time-barred and dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of delayed-discovery to intentional torts | Delayed discovery (traumatic amnesia) delays accrual until recall | Defendants largely concede delayed discovery saves claims against perpetrators | Court: Delayed-discovery applies to Counts I–II; those claims not time-barred |
| Applicability of delayed-discovery to non-intentional torts against church entities | Delayed discovery should apply to vicarious liability and other claims tied to abuse | Defendants: Heamdon limited to intentional torts against perpetrators; negligence claims are time-barred | Court: Follows Cisko — delayed-discovery does not extend to negligence-based Counts IV–VI; those counts dismissed with prejudice |
| Respondeat superior (vicarious liability) | Vicarious liability is predicated on perpetrators’ intentional acts, so delayed-discovery should apply; factual issues exist whether acts were within scope | Defendants: Classify Count III as negligence or argue acts were outside scope of employment as a matter of law | Court: Count III is based on perpetrators’ intentional torts, so delayed-discovery applies and Count III survives; scope/special-fact inquiry reserved for later stages |
| Right to proceed anonymously; First Amendment defenses | Plaintiff: anonymity justified given sensitive nature; First Amendment does not bar tort claims | Caridad: Plaintiff must be identified; First Amendment bars claims against religious institution | Court: Plaintiff may proceed anonymously in filings for now; First Amendment defense rejected under Florida precedent (Malicki) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: courts accept factual allegations and disregard legal conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2000) (delayed-discovery applies to childhood sexual-abuse claims with traumatic amnesia)
- Cisko v. Diocese of Steubenville, 123 So.3d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (limited Hearndon to intentional-tort claims; delayed-discovery not extended to negligence claims)
- Raie v. Cheminova, Inc., 336 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (federal courts must follow state intermediate appellate decisions absent convincing reason the state supreme court would rule differently)
- Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (First Amendment does not bar negligent hiring/supervision or related third-party tort claims against religious institutions)