101 F. Supp. 3d 722
E.D. Mich.2015Background
- Plaintiffs (John Does #1–5 and Mary Doe) challenged Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as amended in 2011 and 2013, bringing a nine‑count First Amended Complaint; both sides moved for judgment on stipulated facts.
- The court previously resolved most claims but reserved judgment on two issues: (1) whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725a(7) (requiring registrants to maintain a state ID with current address) is unconstitutional as applied to John Doe #4 (a homeless registrant), and (2) whether the lifetime registration requirement’s incorporation of the Internet‑identifier reporting duty, Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(i), may be applied retroactively.
- Doe #4 is homeless and the Michigan Secretary of State will not issue identification listing “homeless” as an address; he therefore cannot obtain the state ID SORA requires.
- The Internet reporting provision requires reporting of all email/instant‑message addresses and login names assigned to or used by the registrant; the court previously struck the clause requiring disclosure of identifiers “routinely used by the individual” as unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
- Plaintiffs presented expert research suggesting that risk of sexual reoffense declines over time and that registrants who are offense‑free 25 years pose no greater risk than many non‑sex offenders; defendants rely on law‑enforcement utility and uniformity interests to justify lifetime retroactive reporting.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of § 28.725a(7) as applied to a homeless registrant (Doe #4) | § 28.725a(7) is impossible to comply with because Doe #4 has no address and cannot obtain a state ID; enforcement would criminalize mere status. | Requirement is facially valid; obtaining ID is a legitimate registration condition. | § 28.725a(7) unconstitutional as applied to Doe #4 because it is impossible for him to comply; enforcement enjoined. |
| Retroactive application of the lifetime Internet‑identifier reporting requirement (§ 28.727(1)(i)) | Retroactive lifetime reporting is overbroad and not narrowly tailored: recidivism risk falls over time; only a small percentage of registrants commit internet‑related crimes; retroactivity chills speech/use. | Retroactive lifetime reporting aids investigations and deterrence; information is limited to law enforcement; supports national SORNA uniformity. | Retroactive application is unconstitutional and enjoined. Defendants failed to show the retroactive extension from 25 years to life is narrowly tailored under First Amendment intermediate scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (discussion of fair notice and vagueness principles)
- Powell v. State of Tex., 392 U.S. 514 (status crimes and due process limits)
- Robinson v. State of Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (invalidating punishment based solely on status)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (time, place, manner intermediate scrutiny test)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (retroactivity principles under Due Process)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (presumption against retroactivity)
- United States v. Mise, 240 F.3d 527 (discussing impossibility defense)
- United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599 (addressing registration/due process arguments)
- United States v. Coatoam, 245 F.3d 553 (statutory construction principles)
- Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (Ninth Circuit decision addressing Internet reporting and law‑enforcement interests)
- Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217 (Tenth Circuit precedent on registration provisions)