Doe v. Sipper, 821 F. Supp. 2d 384

Plaintiff Jane Doe, a part-time independent-contractor at New Leaf Brands, alleges Sipper, the COO, raped her in his hotel room after a business dinner during a trade show trip.
Doe connected the hotel-room encounter to travel-booking duties Sipper performed for her future shows; a confirmation email showed travel bookings from New York to Los Angeles and to Las Vegas.
Doe reported the rape to police and subsequently sued Sipper and New Leaf for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and reckless/willful disregard.
New Leaf moved to dismiss, arguing it was not vicariously liable under respondeat superior and that the rape occurred outside the scope of employment.
The court granted in part and denied in part, allowing a theory under the aided-by-agency relation to proceed against New Leaf, while dismissing the scope-of-employment and apparent-authority theories at this stage.
The decision discusses whether § 219(2)(d) (aided by agency relation) can support vicarious liability for common-law torts in the District of Columbia.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the rape was within the scope of employment	Doe argues the assault occurred during business travel and was connected to Sipper's duties.	New Leaf contends the rape was a personal, independent act not within scope.	Rape outside scope of employment as a matter of law.
Apparent authority or agency factors for vicarious liability	Doe contends Sipper used apparent authority/an agency relation to facilitate the assault.	New Leaf argues § 219(2)(d) does not support liability here and there was no apparent authority.	Apparent authority/agency theory not upheld at this stage.
Applicability of Restatement § 219(2)(d) to common-law claims in DC	Doe relies on § 219(2)(d) as a pathway to liability via aided-by-agency relation.	New Leaf argues § 219(2)(d) is not clearly applicable to DC common-law claims; briefs are insufficient.	Court assumes § 219(2)(d) can apply for purposes of this motion, but only as to aided-by-agency theory, and only after discovery.
Whether plaintiff may proceed on an aided-by-agency theory	Doe asserts liability could exist if Sipper’s conduct was aided by his agency relation to New Leaf.	New Leaf contends liability requires more developed facts and cannot be proven now.	Plaintiff may proceed on an aided-by-agency relation theory for now; other theories are rejected pending discovery.

Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. 1984) (sexual assault not a direct outgrowth of employment duties; scope depends on facts)
Schecter v. Merchants Home Delivery, Inc., 892 A.2d 415 (D.C. 2006) (scope of employment requires acts to be in service of employer's interests; independent trespass ≠ within scope)
Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1986) (scope of employment evaluated on objective facts; ordinarily jury question)
Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752 (D.C. 2001) (some sexual assaults may be actuated by employer's interests; jury question in some contexts)
Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rape arising from business dispute may raise scope issue; outer bounds of respondeat superior)
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discusses § 219(2)(d) and its limits for hostile work environment; policies may affect liability)
Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (manager's instrumentality use can support vicarious liability; debated, not controlling in DC)
Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996) (sexual assaults can fall within scope in some jurisdictions; not universally)