Doe v. Sentech Employment Services, Inc.
186 F. Supp. 3d 732
E.D. Mich.2016Background
- Plaintiff applied for and accepted temporary placement through Sentech and, on April 24, 2014, signed two documents at Sentech: an "Authorization for Background Check" (which contained the disclosure/authorization language) and a separate Skill Chart.
- The Authorization form included explanatory and policy language (e.g., hiring policy on felons, a request to disclose felony convictions, warnings about inaccurate information, availability of report details on request, photocopy clause) in addition to the disclosure/authorization.
- Sentech obtained a consumer background report from First Advantage that included criminal-record information; the report was forwarded to the placement employer and Plaintiff was terminated.
- Plaintiff alleges Sentech violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to provide a disclosure in a document "consisting solely" of the disclosure (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)) and by failing to provide pre-adverse action notice; he also alleges the violations were willful.
- Defendant moved to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(6) after filing an answer; the court treated the motion as one under Rule 12(c) and evaluated the pleadings under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
- The Court denied dismissal of Count I, holding Plaintiff plead sufficient facts to state a plausible stand‑alone disclosure violation and a knowing/willful violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the disclosure/authorization document complied with FCRA's stand‑alone requirement (document "consisting solely" of the disclosure) | The Authorization included extraneous information (company felony policy, questions about convictions, warnings about accuracy, photocopy clause, etc.) so it was not a stand‑alone disclosure | The disclosure was clear/conspicuous and the additional language did not defeat the stand‑alone requirement; distractions were immaterial | Court: The extraneous material plausibly violated the stand‑alone requirement; pleadings survive dismissal |
| Whether Plaintiff adequately alleged willfulness (intentional or reckless violation) | Alleges Sentech knowingly and recklessly disregarded the FCRA and related FTC/case guidance, that Sentech certified compliance to the CRA yet inserted extraneous language systemically | Argues Plaintiff failed to plead objective unreasonableness or reckless conduct sufficient for willfulness | Court: Allegations that defendant knew the requirement and nonetheless failed to comply suffice at pleading stage to allege a knowing (willful) violation |
| Procedural: Timeliness of Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion | N/A | Motion filed after answer; defendant contends dismissal appropriate on merits | Court: Treated late 12(b)(6) motion as Rule 12(c) motion and applied 12(b)(6) standard; proceeded to deny dismissal on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1988) (late Rule 12(b) motion may be treated as Rule 12(c) motion)
- Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (complaint must be construed in plaintiff's favor on motion to dismiss)
- Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008) (courts may consider certain documents referenced in the complaint on a motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (context‑specific plausibility inquiry and pleading standards)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (willfulness under FCRA requires intentional or reckless violation)
- Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2000) (statutes read according to straightforward common‑sense meanings)
- Robrinzine v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 920 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (interpreting "solely" to mean to the exclusion of all else in the FCRA stand‑alone disclosure context)