352 F. Supp. 3d 1205
M.D. Fla.2019Background
- John Doe, a former Rollins student, was accused by Jane Roe of sexual assault; Rollins investigated under its Title IX Sexual Misconduct Policy and retained investigator D.B. Wallace.
- Wallace interviewed Roe, Doe, and 22 witnesses (none with first‑hand knowledge); the investigative report credited Roe, included inflammatory references to Doe's sexual history, and assessed Roe credible while finding Doe not credible.
- Rollins' Title IX coordinator Oriana Jimenez issued a letter adopting the report, found Doe responsible, imposed sanctions (no‑contact order, permanent separation noted on transcript, ban from graduation/alumni events), and denied Doe's appeal.
- Doe sued Rollins asserting two Title IX claims (erroneous outcome; selective enforcement) and a state law breach of contract claim based on violation of the published Sexual Misconduct Policy and related procedures.
- Rollins moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the complaint fails to plausibly plead gender bias, contains immaterial allegations, and is a shotgun pleading; the court denied the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doe plausibly pleaded an Erroneous Outcome Title IX claim (bias caused wrong result) | Doe alleged external/public pressure on Rollins to favor accusers, specific procedural anomalies in his investigation (crediting friends of Roe, reliance on prior sexual history) showing gender bias | Rollins argued allegations are conclusory, insufficient to infer gender bias and thus fail Yusuf prong two | Court: Denied motion — allegations of external pressure plus case‑specific circumstantial facts suffice at pleading stage to make bias plausible |
| Whether Doe plausibly pleaded a Selective Enforcement Title IX claim (unequal treatment by sex) | Doe alleged Rollins treated Roe more favorably, failed to investigate conduct by Roe that could have led to charges, and imposed harsher sanctions on Doe because of his gender | Rollins argued no similarly situated comparator or plausible inference of gender‑based disparate treatment | Court: Denied motion — allegations that Roe was similarly situated and treated preferentially are plausible at pleading stage |
| Whether Doe pleaded a breach of contract (deviation from published policy and implied covenant) | Doe identified specific Sexual Misconduct Policy provisions and alleged Rollins violated them (biased investigation, no cross‑examination, outcome not based on credible/relevant evidence) | Rollins contended the contract/handbook claims were insufficiently pled or implausible | Court: Denied motion — plaintiff alleged specific provisions and factual allegations supporting a breach at pleading stage |
| Whether portions of the complaint were immaterial/should be struck or whether complaint failed Rule 8 | Rollins sought to strike references (e.g., to Mancini) and argued the complaint was a shotgun/overly verbose | Doe maintained the references were relevant to establishing pressure and bias and that the pleading met Rule 8 | Court: Denied requests to strike and denied Rule 8 attack; found allegations relevant and sufficiently clear |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (conclusory allegations insufficient; plausibility standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading framework)
- Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir.) (recognizing erroneous outcome and selective enforcement Title IX theories)
- Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.) (recognizing implied private right under Title IX)
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir.) (external pressure allegations can support inference of gender bias)
- Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir.) (pattern/external pressure plus specific facts may make intentional discrimination plausible)
- Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D. Mass.) (permitting selective enforcement/breach claims to survive pleading stage)
- Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Fla.) (declining to dismiss breach of contract and good‑faith claims where policies were allegedly breached)