179 F. Supp. 3d 583
E.D. Va.2016Background
- Student ("Doe") was expelled from George Mason University after a constitutionally defective disciplinary appeal process that overturned an initial panel verdict of not responsible for alleged sexual misconduct arising from an October 27, 2013 incident.
- The initial hearing (focused on the October 27 incident) lasted ten hours, complied with due process, and found Doe not responsible; GMU staffer Brent Ericson allowed an improper appeal, met ex parte with the complainant (Roe), and overturned the panel, imposing expulsion; Dean Blank-Godlove affirmed after off‑the‑record ex parte contact.
- Doe also was disciplined for a March 2014 text threatening self‑harm; the court held that punishment for that text violated the First Amendment.
- Court concluded GMU’s procedures violated Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and that some of the punished speech was constitutionally protected; qualified immunity barred individual damages, so equitable relief was sought.
- Parties agreed on reinstatement, expungement of the expulsion, and that Ericson and Blank‑Godlove should be disqualified from any future proceedings involving Roe; dispute remained over whether GMU may bring further disciplinary charges and whether Doe may proceed pseudonymously.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reinstatement and expungement | Reinstatement + expungement required to restore status quo and remove stigma | GMU did not oppose reinstatement/expungement | Granted: Doe to be reinstated and expulsion expunged |
| Authority to bring new disciplinary proceedings about prior‑occurring events | GMU should be barred from bringing any further charges based on allegations that could have been raised initially (finality, prejudice, deterrence of piecemeal proceedings) | GMU must be able to pursue Title IX obligations and investigate other alleged incidents; enjoining would impair victims’ remedies | Partial: GMU may bring new charges for events before notice date only if resolved promptly; cannot re‑adjudicate the October 27 matter already decided in Doe's favor |
| Time limit and procedural safeguards for any new charges | Absent a prompt deadline, delay will prejudice Doe’s defense | GMU points to need to investigate; rapid deadlines may impede thorough inquiry | Imposed 60‑day limit from final judgment to fully resolve any new sexual‑misconduct charges based on events before Aug. 19, 2014; Ericson and Blank‑Godlove barred from involvement |
| Use of pseudonyms for Doe and Roe | Anonymity required to protect from stigma, harassment, and possible retaliatory harm given sensitive sexual‑misconduct allegations and public attention | GMU argued public right of access and that pseudonymity undermines openness | Overruled objection: pseudonymity permitted as extraordinary but tailored protection given severity/stigma and limited redaction of identities only |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1934) (equitable remedies aim to do justice on specific facts)
- Belk v. Charlotte‑Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (injunctions may not be punitive)
- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (four‑factor test for injunctive relief applies to permanent injunctions)
- James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993) (factors for permitting pseudonymous litigation)
- Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014) (public’s right of access and standards for pseudonymous litigation)
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (issue preclusion and concern over piecemeal prosecutions discussed)
- Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1986) (presumption of regularity for government officials)
- Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (university disciplinary due‑process remedy often is reinstatement unless a new hearing affords due process)