Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1190

Jane Doe, a seaman on Princess Cruise Lines’ M/S Star Princess, alleges rape by fellow crew in a crew-cabin after an off-duty party in June 2009; cruise line allegedly delayed medical treatment and hindered her access to care ashore.
Doe reported the rape to ship officers; she faced interrogation and was not given timely medical attention or counseling; treatment was eventually provided off the ship in Seattle after more than 24 hours.
Cruise line fired one involved crew member but kept others employed; it allegedly prevented Doe from disembarking for medical reasons and later sent her back to Russia without maintenance and cure.
Doe’s amended complaint asserts ten claims across maritime and common-law tort theories; five claims are maritime (Jones Act, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, Seaman’s Wage Act) and five are tort claims (false imprisonment, IIED, spoliation, privacy, fraudulent misrepresentation).
The district court denied Princess’s motion to compel arbitration as to all counts; Princess appeals seeking to compel arbitration based on the crew agreement’s arbitration clause.
The court conducts de novo review of the arbitration clause’s scope under FAA/Convention, independent of the district court’s reasoning.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of arbitration for Counts I–V	Doe contends Counts I–V arise from seaman status and duties, within the clause.	Princess argues Doe’s seaman claims relate to employment so are arbitrable.	Counts I–V fall within the arbitration clause.
Scope of arbitration for Counts VI–X	Doe argues Counts VI–X arise from post-rape conduct not connected to the crew agreement.	Princess contends all claims relate to employment and are arbitrable.	Counts VI–X do not fall within the arbitration clause.
Gateway question of arbitrability	(Not explicitly argued by Doe; court considers general principle)	Court should decide gateway issues, not arbitrators.	Gateway arbitrability is a court question; invited error doctrine does not apply to reverse decision.
Interpretation of scope language (arising out/related to/connected with)	Arising out/related to/connected with should be interpreted broadly to cover Doe’s claims.	Limiting language must be given effect to limit scope to employment duties.	Arises-out/related-to/connected-with are limiting terms; not all-encompassing; five counts fit within scope, five do not.

Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (arb. scope not broadened to encompass all employment-related disputes; facts akin to Doe.)
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2008) (determines scope of arbitration by direct relationship to contract duties.)
Wheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993) (arbitrability determinations reviewed de novo.)
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1985) (governs arbitration where contract includes international aspects.)
Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109 (11th Cir. 2001) (limits of ‘arising out of’/‘related to’/‘connected with’ language.)
Becker v. Davis, 491 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (cannot force arbitration of disputes not agreed to.)
Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 117 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1997) (contract interpretation favors applying all provisions.)
Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1995) (maintenance and cure context within shipboard duties.)
Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009) (maritime claims under FAA/Convention context.)
Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (seamen contract exemptions to FAA/Convention.)