DOE v. POMPEO, 451 F.Supp.3d 100

Background

Plaintiffs ("Doe" and her two children) are lawful permanent residents who obtained green cards in 2013 but have lived continuously in Iran since 2015; Doe alleges her husband controlled and concealed their green cards and prevented their return.
They lack valid travel documents to board transportation to a U.S. port of entry and seek a court order compelling the Government to provide documents enabling travel (they challenge SB‑1/consular procedures as constitutionally deficient).
Plaintiffs concede SB‑1 returning‑resident visas and other administrative remedies exist but refuse to submit to the SB‑1 process, arguing it affords no meaningful due process (no hearing, counsel, confrontation, appeal, or record).
The Government offered to expedite SB‑1 applications but would not guarantee a decision by a fixed date; it moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and ripeness; plaintiffs moved for preliminary and expedited merits relief.
The Court found Article III standing, prudential ripeness, and excused exhaustion, but held plaintiffs have no constitutional due‑process right to admission after a prolonged absence from the United States and entered summary judgment for the Government.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Doe argues she has an imminent, concrete injury from prospect of being forced into an unconstitutional SB‑1 process and thus can sue before applying.	Government contends Doe lacks standing because she hasn’t used available administrative remedies and the injury isn’t traceable to it.	Court held Doe has standing: her injury is like Rafeedie/Cronin (regulated class; imminent prospect of unconstitutional process) and is redressable.
Ripeness / Exhaustion	Doe says immediate judicial relief is necessary because waiting risks discovery by husband and harm; administrative process would be inadequate and cause delay.	Government says case is unripe and non‑exhausted; Doe should apply for SB‑1 first so agency can build a record.	Court excused exhaustion and found prudential ripeness under Rafeedie given urgent hardship and that the claim involves legal (not factual) questions.
Constitutional due process right to admission	Doe contends as LPRs she is entitled to due process before denial of admission and SB‑1 process is insufficient.	Government argues that length of continuous absence (since 2015) converts plaintiffs into initial entrants for constitutional purposes, so no due‑process right to reentry.	Court held that under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent (Mezei, Rafeedie etc.) length of absence is dispositive; plaintiffs’ multi‑year absence defeats any constitutional due‑process claim.
Remedy / Burden of proof in SB‑1 process	Doe seeks an order compelling travel documents (bypassing SB‑1) and argues Woodby burden rules should constrain SB‑1 fact‑finding.	Government says remedy improperly displaces Executive immigration discretion; Woodby governs removal hearings, not consular SB‑1 adjudications.	Court declined to compel documents and rejected application of Woodby to create a standalone burden‑of‑proof right here; remedy and burden issues are subsumed by the threshold due‑process ruling.

Key Cases Cited

Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (length of absence determines whether an LPR retains constitutional due‑process protections on reentry; allowed pre‑enforcement challenge to procedures).
United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (alien abroad ~19 months could be treated as initial entrant and excluded without due process protections).
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (judicial role limited to assessing constitutional sufficiency of procedures; immigration control is primarily Executive/Legislative).
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (permanent resident abroad for short period retained due‑process rights to contest exclusion).
Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (in deportation proceedings, Government must prove deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence absent contrary congressional command).
United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing abandonment and statutory framework for determining whether absence interrupts permanent‑resident status).
Cronin v. FAA, 73 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (regulated‑class pre‑enforcement challenges can confer standing where enforcement against plaintiffs is likely).
Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (courts assume merits for standing analysis; procedural‑challenge standing can exist even if plaintiff hasn’t exhausted administrative routes).