Doe v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 951 N.E.2d 337

Plaintiff is a level three sex offender residing in a rest home; statute § 178K(2)(e) makes such residence placement a crime for level three offenders.
Board classified plaintiff as level three after de novo hearing; rest home environment described as stable and mitigating for risk, but age and prior offenses noted as aggravating.
Plaintiff challenged constitutionality of § 178K(2)(e) as applied to him; seeking declaration that it violates due process.
Statute imposes residence restrictions without individualized risk assessment or balancing of liberty/property interests against public safety.
Context includes prior sex offender registration framework and related due process requirements for individualized hearings.
Court remands for a declaration that § 178K(2)(e) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff and not enforceable against him.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 178K(2)(e) as applied violates due process.	Duffly argues statute infringes liberty and property interests without individualized assessment.	Commonwealth asserts broad public safety purpose with uniform prohibition.	Yes; statute unconstitutional as applied; remanded for individualized determination.

Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136 (1997) (due process for individualized hearing before registration)
Doe v. Attorney Gen. (No. 2), 425 Mass. 217 (1997) (privacy and liberty interests implicated by registry)
Doe v. Attorney Gen., No. 8725, 450 Mass. 780 (2008) (necessity of individualized risk assessment in related context)
Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418 (2001) (due process balancing for liberty interests)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor due process balancing test)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (irretrievable presumption not justified by policy)
Coe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 442 Mass. 250 (2004) (limits of publication and need for individualized risk assessment)