Doe v. Noem, 781 F.Supp.3d 1055

Plaintiff, an international student on an F-1 visa, had his SEVIS record terminated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on an alleged criminal records check and/or visa revocation.
Plaintiff asserts he has never been convicted of or charged with a crime; he was detained twice in 2024 but no charges were filed.
Following SEVIS termination, plaintiff was notified he had no grace period and could face removal without delay.
Plaintiff filed motions to proceed under a pseudonym, for a protective order, and for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent his detention or removal based on the SEVIS termination.
The DHS argued against the need for anonymity, the appropriateness of the TRO, and the court’s power to grant such relief given statutory limits on judicial review in immigration matters.
The court held a hearing and granted all plaintiff’s requests, including protection of his identity, and enjoined DHS from enforcing the SEVIS termination against him pending further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proceeding under pseudonym & protective order	Plaintiff faces risk of retaliation, public shame, and harm due to anti-immigrant sentiment.	Unnecessary to protect identity; standard presumption is use of real names.	Granted: Threatened harm justifies anonymity; no prejudice to defendants.
TRO regarding SEVIS termination	Likely to succeed on merits; termination was arbitrary and contrary to regulation; will suffer irreparable harm without relief.	TRO would alter status quo; SEVIS termination not unlawful or consequential; judicial review barred by statutes.	Granted: Relief restores status quo ante; arbitrary action; statutes do not bar relief; irreparable harm shown.
APA review and adequacy of alternative remedies	APA allows challenge; Privacy Act does not give relief to non-permanent residents.	Privacy Act is adequate alternative and thus precludes APA review.	Granted: No adequate alternative; Privacy Act does not apply to this plaintiff.
Court jurisdiction re: removal/detention	Request for stay of removal is based on unlawful SEVIS action, not prosecutorial discretion.	8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and § 1226(e) bar judicial review of removal and detention decisions.	Granted: Cited provisions do not bar relief where challenge is to the legal basis of agency action.

Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2010) (pseudonym use permitted when need for anonymity outweighs prejudice and public interest)
Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (framework for allowing pseudonymity in litigation)
Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) (TRO and preliminary injunction standards are essentially the same)
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (preliminary injunctive relief standard)
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining status quo ante litem in injunction context)
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020) (APA review of agency action is limited to reasoned decisionmaking)
Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (arbitrary and capricious standard under APA)
United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) as a narrow limitation on judicial review)
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (narrow interpretation of limitations on judicial review of removal actions)
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (limits of judicial review for detention decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e))