438 F.Supp.3d 172
S.D.N.Y.2020Background
- John Doe, an NYU Tisch student, was accused by Jane Roe of non‑consensual sex on March 17, 2017; Doe contends the encounter was consensual.
- Roe filed a complaint Feb 18, 2018; NYU investigators conducted multiple investigations and held a first hearing (Aug 22, 2018) where Director Jolley found Doe responsible and suspended him.
- An Appeal Panel vacated that outcome, ordered further investigation, and stayed sanctions; a de novo hearing before an external arbitrator (Jan 28, 2019) found Doe not responsible, and an appeal affirmed that result.
- Doe sued NYU and individual administrators alleging Title IX selective enforcement and state tort and NYSHRL claims; Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court dismissed the federal Title IX claim for failure to plead (1) treatment of similarly situated female students and (2) a minimal plausible inference of discriminatory intent, declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, and denied leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doe plausibly pleaded a Title IX selective‑enforcement claim | NYU's procedures and outcomes show sex bias; minimal plausible inference of bias suffices at pleading stage | Doe failed to identify any similarly situated female treated differently; must plead comparators and discriminatory intent | Dismissed: plaintiff did not allege similarly situated female comparators; claim fails |
| Whether investigative/hearing irregularities + public pressure support inference of discriminatory intent | Investigative defects and public criticism of NYU create a minimal plausible inference of sex bias | Alleged irregularities were minor or cured; public pressure allegations are insufficiently plausible or not shown to be known to decision‑makers | Dismissed: deficiencies do not rise to "clearly irregular" threshold and public pressure allegations are too thin |
| Whether plaintiff should get discovery to identify comparators | Discovery is needed because comparator information is confidential | Failure to plead is fatal; discovery is not warranted where the complaint is inadequate | Denied: a plaintiff who fails to state a claim is not entitled to discovery |
| Whether leave to amend should be granted | Doe sought leave to amend if complaint dismissed | Defendants noted prior opportunity to amend and prejudicial/futile amendment | Denied: Doe had prior chance and made a cursory request without proposed amendments |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (describing Title IX erroneous‑outcome and selective‑enforcement frameworks and minimal pleading standard for discriminatory intent)
- Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (articulating that combination of clearly irregular process plus public pressure can support inference of sex bias)
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (framework for Title IX challenges to university disciplinary proceedings)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must state a claim plausible on its face)
