Doe v. McCoy
297 Neb. 321
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs filed a 2016 tort complaint (using pseudonyms Jane and John Doe) alleging sexual battery, exhibitionism, and voyeurism by defendant McCoy occurring between 1991–1999; Jane was a minor at the time.
- Jane Doe was born in 1985 and turned 21 on September 21, 2006; John Doe asserted a derivative loss-of-consortium claim based on Jane’s alleged injuries.
- Defendant moved to dismiss under Nebraska statutes of limitations and for failure to sue under real names (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301); plaintiffs later submitted their real names confidentially but had not sought prior court permission to proceed anonymously.
- The district court dismissed on two grounds: (1) the claims were time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-207 and 25-213 (tolled until age 21), which caused the limitations to expire in 2010; and (2) plaintiffs improperly used pseudonyms without court approval.
- Plaintiffs argued that the 2012 enactment of § 25-228 (extending the limitations to 12 years after the plaintiff’s 21st birthday for childhood sexual-assault victims) rendered their 2016 suit timely.
- The district court held § 25-228 did not apply because the earlier limitations bar had already become complete in 2010; the court relied on precedent precluding legislative revival of already-extinguished claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-228 (2012) extends the limitations period for claims already time-barred | § 25-228’s "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language applies and extends filing deadline to 12 years after age 21, so 2016 filing is timely | Existing statutes (§§ 25-207 & 25-213) ran in 2010; a later statute cannot resurrect a claim already barred | § 25-228 does not revive claims already extinguished before its enactment; plaintiff’s claims were time-barred |
| Whether defendant’s vested right in a completed limitations bar can be impaired by later legislation | Legislature intended § 25-228 to apply generally and override other law | A completed statutory bar gives defendants vested rights protected by due process; legislature cannot revive extinguished claims | Court applies precedent: vested bar cannot be impaired; § 25-228’s legislative history confirms no intent to resurrect barred claims |
| Whether plaintiffs could proceed under pseudonyms without prior court approval | Plaintiffs proceeded anonymously and later disclosed real names confidentially | Parties must sue in real names per § 25-301; anonymous pleading requires prior court approval and exceptional circumstances | Court held plaintiffs had not obtained permission and the allegations were not sufficiently "exceptional" to override openness; dismissal on name ground affirmed but not reached as dispositive |
| Whether John Doe’s derivative loss-of-consortium claim survives if Jane’s claims are dismissed | N/A — derivative on Jane’s viable claim | If Jane’s claims are barred, John’s derivative claim fails | John Doe’s claim dismissed as derivative of Jane’s barred action |
Key Cases Cited
- Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (1991) (legislative amendment cannot resurrect an action already extinguished; completed statutory bar creates vested right protected by due process)
- Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (1994) (reinforces rule that a later statute cannot deprive defendant of an already-completed limitations bar)
- Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (2009) (derivative nature of loss-of-consortium claims tied to viability of primary plaintiff’s action)