Doe v. McCoy
297 Neb. 321
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs filed a tort complaint on Feb 3, 2016 alleging sexual abuse of “Jane Doe” (born 1985) by defendant McCoy between 1991–1999; John Doe asserted loss of consortium.
- Jane was a minor during the alleged abuse; she turned 21 on Sept 21, 2006 and married John in 2014.
- Defendant moved to dismiss for (1) statutes-of-limitations bar and (2) failure to sue in real names (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301); plaintiffs later filed their real names under seal.
- District court dismissed: it held §§ 25-207 (4-year tort SOL) and 25-213 (tolling for minors until age 21) caused the SOL to expire on Sept 21, 2010; § 25-228 (enacted 2012 extending child-sexual-assault claims to 12 years after 21st birthday) did not revive already-barred claims.
- District court also denied anonymous pleading as not sufficiently exceptional, but the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal based solely on statutes of limitations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-228 (2012) extends the SOL for child sexual-abuse claims where prior SOL already expired | § 25-228 extends the SOL to 12 years after 21st birthday, so Jane had until Sept 21, 2018; therefore the 2016 complaint is timely | A completed statutory bar (SOL expired Sept 21, 2010 under §§ 25-207 & 25-213) cannot be resurrected by later statute; § 25-228 enacted after the bar cannot apply | Court held § 25-228 does not apply where the prior SOL had already run; action was time-barred when filed |
| Whether the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” in § 25-228 overrides constitutional/vested-right protections and prior case law | The phrase shows legislative intent to apply § 25-228 despite prior statutes or constitutional protections | Legislative history and precedent show Legislature did not intend to resurrect already-extinguished causes; cannot impair defendants’ vested bar | Court held legislative history demonstrates no intent to revive already-barred actions; precedent limits § 25-228’s reach |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by denying anonymous pleading (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301) | Plaintiffs needed anonymity given sexual-abuse allegations and privacy concerns | Defendant asserted requirement to sue in real name; plaintiffs failed to seek prior court approval to proceed anonymously | Court did not reach this issue on appeal because SOL dismissal was dispositive; district court had denied anonymity below |
| Whether derivative loss-of-consortium claim survives if underlying claim is barred | John’s claim depends on Jane’s viable claim | If Jane’s claim is time-barred, John’s derivative claim fails | Court dismissed John’s loss-of-consortium claim as derivative and barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Harring v. Gress, 295 Neb. 852 (2017) (standard: de novo review of dismissal)
- Lindner v. Kindig, 293 Neb. 661 (2016) (choice of applicable limitation statute is question of law)
- Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (1994) (legislature may not deprive defendant of a bar already complete)
- Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (1991) (amendment cannot resurrect an action extinguished by prior limitations; vested rights protect completed bars)
- Irwin v. West Gate Bank, 288 Neb. 353 (2014) (appellate courts need not decide issues unnecessary to disposition)
- Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (2009) (loss-of-consortium claims are derivative)
- Stewart v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 294 Neb. 1010 (2016) (statutory construction allows use of legislative history when statute is ambiguous)