Doe v. McCoy
297 Neb. 321
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs filed a tort complaint in 2016 alleging sexual abuse of "Jane Doe" by William McCoy between 1991–1999; Jane was born in 1985 and was a minor during the alleged abuse.
- Jane sought damages for sexual battery, exhibitionism, voyeurism, and emotional distress; John sought loss of consortium.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting the claims were time barred and that the suit improperly used pseudonyms rather than real party names.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the applicable limitations (4-year rule tolled until age 21) expired in 2010, and (2) plaintiffs failed to obtain court permission to proceed anonymously.
- Plaintiffs argued Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-228 (2012) extended the limitations period (12 years after the plaintiff’s 21st birthday) and therefore their 2016 filing was timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-228 (enacted 2012) revives or extends limitations for claims already time-barred before enactment | § 25-228 extends the limitations period to 12 years after age 21, so the 2016 complaint is timely | Preexisting limitations ran in 2010; a later statute cannot resurrect a completed statutory bar or impair a defendant’s vested right | Court held § 25-228 does not apply to claims already time-barred when enacted; action was barred |
| Whether the complaint may proceed under pseudonyms without prior court approval | Plaintiffs used pseudonyms due to privacy concerns; disclosure of names to the court suffices | § 25-301 requires actions in real party names; plaintiffs did not obtain prior court approval to proceed anonymously | Court ruled plaintiffs should have sought and obtained permission to proceed anonymously; dismissal on this ground affirmed but not reached as dispositive |
| Proper application/interpretation of "notwithstanding any other provision of law" in § 25-228 | That phrase shows legislative intent to override prior bars and constitutional/precedential protections | Legislative history and precedent show the Legislature did not intend to resurrect already-extinguished claims | Court read phrase narrowly; legislative history indicates no intent to revive completed bars |
| Whether appellate review of dismissal is de novo and which statutes control | (procedural) Plaintiffs urged application of § 25-228; also argued prior precedents wrongly decided | (procedural) Dismissal reviewed de novo; statutes of limitation are questions of law | Court applied de novo review, concluded existing statutes (§§ 25-207 and 25-213) barred suit; affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541 (1994) (legislature may not deprive defendant of a limitations bar that has already become complete)
- Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565, 466 N.W.2d 771 (1991) (amendment cannot resurrect an action extinguished under prior statute; vested right in completed bar implicates due process)
- Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289, 770 N.W.2d 619 (2009) (loss of consortium is derivative of a viable underlying claim)
- Lindner v. Kindig, 293 Neb. 661, 881 N.W.2d 579 (2016) (determination of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law)