Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321

Background

Plaintiffs filed a tort complaint in 2016 under the pseudonyms “Jane Doe” and “John Doe,” alleging sexual abuse of Jane (born 1985) by defendant McCoy between 1991–1999; John asserted loss of consortium.
Jane was a minor during the alleged abuse and turned 21 on September 21, 2006.
Defendant moved to dismiss for (1) statute-of-limitations bar and (2) failure to sue in real names under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301. Plaintiffs later disclosed their real names confidentially.
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding §§ 25-207 (4-year tort limitations) and 25-213 (tolling for minors until age 21) meant the claims expired September 21, 2010.
Plaintiffs argued Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-228 (enacted 2012 extending child-sexual-assault claims to 12 years after age 21) made their 2016 suit timely. The court rejected that, concluding § 25-228 does not revive actions already time-barred when enacted.
The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds and did not reach the pseudonym issue.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 25-228 (2012) extends filing deadline for Jane’s childhood sexual-assault tort so the 2016 suit is timely	§ 25-228 extends limitations to 12 years after 21, so plaintiffs had until 2018	Existing tolling (§§ 25-207 & 25-213) ran in 2010; a later-enacted statute cannot revive an already-complete bar	Held: § 25-228 does not apply to actions already barred when enacted; claim was time-barred
Whether legislative phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” in § 25-228 overrides constitutional/precedent-based vested-bar rule	Phrase shows legislative intent to override prior bars and revive barred claims	Legislative history and precedent show Legislature did not intend to resurrect already-extinguished claims; cannot impair vested defendant rights	Held: Legislative history confirms no intent to resurrect barred claims; phrase does not overcome vested-bar rule
Whether precedent (Givens/Schendt) permitting vested bars to remain intact should be overturned or inapplicable here	Plaintiffs urged those cases are wrongly decided or inapplicable	Precedent controls; statutory history shows Legislature accepted that rule	Held: Court applied precedent; no need to overturn—bar remains intact
Whether John Doe’s derivative loss-of-consortium claim survives if Jane’s claim is dismissed	§ 25-228 would save Jane → save John	John’s claim is derivative of Jane’s; if Jane’s claim is barred, his is barred too	Held: John’s claim dismissed as derivative of Jane’s time-barred claim

Key Cases Cited

Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (legislative amendments cannot resurrect actions already extinguished; vested bar is protected by due process)
Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (limitation period in effect at filing generally governs; Legislature may not deprive defendant of a completed bar)
Lindner v. Kindig, 293 Neb. 661 (determination of applicable statute of limitations is question of law)
Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (loss-of-consortium claim is derivative of primary claimant’s viable action)