Doe v. McCoy
297 Neb. 321
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs filed a 2016 tort complaint (using pseudonyms Jane and John Doe) alleging sexual abuse of Jane by defendant McCoy from ~1991–1999 when she was a minor; John alleged loss of consortium.
- Jane was born in 1985 and turned 21 on September 21, 2006; plaintiffs filed suit February 3, 2016.
- McCoy moved to dismiss for (1) time-bar under Nebraska statutes of limitations and (2) failure to sue in real names under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301; plaintiffs later disclosed their real names confidentially.
- The district court held the claims were barred under §§ 25-207 (4-year limitations) and 25-213 (tolling for minors until age 21), meaning the limitations expired September 21, 2010; it rejected application of § 25-228 (enacted 2012) as retroactively reviving extinguished claims.
- The court also denied anonymous pleading as not sufficiently exceptional, but the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal on the statute-of-limitations ground and did not decide the anonymity issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-228 (2012) extends filing deadline for child-sexual-assault victims whose prior limitations had already run | § 25-228 extends the deadline to 12 years after the plaintiff’s 21st birthday, so the 2016 filing was timely | § 25-228 cannot revive claims already extinguished by existing limitations; vested bar cannot be impaired | Held: § 25-228 does not apply to actions already time-barred when it was enacted; action was barred |
| Whether the district court erred applying §§ 25-207 and 25-213 to these facts | § 25-207/25-213 should be displaced by § 25-228 | §§ 25-207 and 25-213 tolled until age 21, so limitations ran in 2010 | Held: applying §§ 25-207 and 25-213 was correct; limitations expired in 2010 |
| Whether legislative language “notwithstanding any other provision of law” renders § 25-228 retroactive to overcome constitutional vested-rights protection | The phrase shows legislative intent to override prior bars and apply § 25-228 to all qualifying claims | Legislative history shows sponsor expressly disclaimed intent to resurrect already-extinguished claims; cannot impair vested defenses | Held: legislative history indicates no intent to revive extinguished claims; § 25-228 not retroactive here |
| Whether plaintiffs could proceed anonymously under § 25-301 and common-law exceptions | Plaintiffs needed anonymity due to sensitive allegations and privacy | § 25-301 requires real-party names absent court approval; no exceptional justification shown | Court did not reach this on appeal; district court had denied anonymity as not sufficiently exceptional |
Key Cases Cited
- Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (1994) (legislature may not revive actions already extinguished by prior limitations)
- Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (1991) (amendment cannot resurrect actions extinguished by prior statute; vested limitations defenses protected by due process)
- Irwin v. West Gate Bank, 288 Neb. 353 (2014) (appellate courts need not decide issues unnecessary to disposition)
- Lindner v. Kindig, 293 Neb. 661 (2016) (choice of applicable statute of limitations is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Harring v. Gress, 295 Neb. 852 (2017) (grant of motion to dismiss reviewed de novo)
- Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (2009) (loss of consortium claims are derivative of primary claimant's viable claim)