Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321

Plaintiffs filed a 2016 tort complaint under the pseudonyms “Jane Doe” and “John Doe” alleging sexual abuse by William McCoy between 1991–1999, when Jane was a minor (born 1985).
Jane alleged severe emotional harm; John alleged loss of consortium based on Jane’s claim. Jane turned 21 on September 21, 2006.
Defendant moved to dismiss: (1) as time-barred under Nebraska statutes of limitations, and (2) because the complaint used pseudonyms in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-301.
District court dismissed on both grounds, reasoning §§ 25-207 (4-year tort limitation) and 25-213 (toll until age 21) ran in 2010, and the 2012 statute § 25-228 (extended 12-year period for child-sexual-assault victims) could not revive an already-complete bar.
Plaintiffs appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the statute-of-limitations issue de novo and affirmed dismissal on that basis, not reaching the pseudonym issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 25-228 (2012) extended the limitations period so the 2016 suit was timely	§ 25-228 affords victims of child sexual assault 12 years after age 21 to sue, so filing in 2016 was within the extended period	Prior law (§§ 25-207 & 25-213) created a complete bar in 2010; a later statute cannot resurrect an extinguished claim	The court held § 25-228 does not revive claims already time-barred when it was enacted; action was time-barred
Whether legislative language “notwithstanding any other provision of law” in § 25-228 overrides constitutional protections/precedent barring revival	That phrase shows legislative intent to apply § 25-228 regardless of prior bars, so it should govern	Legislative history shows sponsor disclaimed any intent to resurrect already-extinguished claims; cannot override vested rights recognized by prior case law	The court held legislative history demonstrates no intent to impair vested bars; therefore § 25-228 does not apply retroactively to already-barred claims

Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (Neb. 1994) (legislature may not revive claims already time-barred; the limitation period in effect at filing generally governs)
Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (Neb. 1991) (amendment cannot resurrect an action extinguished by a prior statute; vested right in completed statutory bar protected)
Lindner v. Kindig, 293 Neb. 661 (Neb. 2016) (question of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law reviewed de novo)
Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (Neb. 2009) (derivative claims such as loss of consortium fail if the primary claim fails)