Doe v. McCoy
297 Neb. 321
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs filed a 2016 tort complaint under the pseudonyms "Jane Doe" and "John Doe" alleging sexual abuse of Jane by defendant McCoy between 1991 and 1999, when Jane was a minor.
- Jane was born in 1985 and turned 21 on September 21, 2006; John asserted a derivative loss-of-consortium claim based on Jane’s allegations.
- Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs improperly proceeded under pseudonyms.
- The district court concluded the applicable statutes (§ 25-207 and § 25-213) tolled the limitations until Jane’s 21st birthday, so the 4-year period ended September 21, 2010; the complaint filed in 2016 was thus barred.
- Plaintiffs argued the 2012 enactment of § 25-228 (extending certain child-sexual-assault claims to 12 years after age 21) revived their claims; the court rejected that argument, holding § 25-228 does not apply to claims already time-barred when it was enacted.
- The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds and did not reach the pseudonym issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 25-228 (2012) extends limitations for child sexual-assault torts to 12 years after age 21 and applies to actions already time-barred when enacted | § 25-228 applies "notwithstanding any other provision of law," so it extends the limitations and makes the 2016 complaint timely (deadline Sept. 21, 2018) | Prior statutes (§ 25-207 + § 25-213) tolled until age 21 and produced a bar in 2010; a later-enacted statute cannot revive an extinguished bar | Held: § 25-228 does not revive claims already barred when enacted; plaintiffs’ action was time-barred in 2010 and dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565 (1991) (a statutory amendment cannot resurrect an action extinguished under the prior statute; vested bar rights protected by due process)
- Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573 (1994) (limitation period in effect when action is filed generally governs; Legislature may not deprive a defendant of a bar that has become complete)
- Rasmussen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Neb. 289 (2009) (derivative loss-of-consortium claim depends on viability of primary claim)