587 F.Supp.3d 249
E.D. Pa.2022Background
- Plaintiff (Ms. Doe) reported a sexual assault by two Manor College students and pursued an internal appeal of the College’s Code of Conduct Committee decision.
- Manor College thereafter issued sanctions for 13 Code violations and removed Doe from the campus dormitory; Doe claimed those actions were retaliation for her protected Title IX activity.
- At summary judgment the court held Doe had engaged in protected activity and suffered adverse action, leaving causation for trial.
- The trial dispute concerned the proper causation standard for a Title IX retaliation claim: motivating-factor (lesser) vs. but‑for (stricter).
- Manor sought a but‑for jury instruction relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s Title VII decision in Nassar and various post‑Nassar authorities; Doe argued motivating‑factor applies under Title IX and Third Circuit precedent.
- The district court denied Manor’s proposed but‑for instruction, applying motivating‑factor causation and explaining why Nassar, contrary authorities, and the law‑of‑the‑case argument did not compel but‑for here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper causation standard for Title IX retaliation claims | Doe: motivating‑factor standard governs (Title IX "on the basis of sex") | Manor: but‑for causation required | Court: motivating‑factor applies |
| Whether Nassar (Title VII) overrides Title IX causation | Doe: Nassar does not control; Title IX differs structurally and Third Circuit precedent controls | Manor: Nassar requires transplanting but‑for standard to Title IX retaliation claims | Court: Nassar does not override motivating‑factor for Title IX in this Circuit |
| Whether law‑of‑the‑case binds court to but‑for | Doe: prior summary judgment did not decide causation standard; doctrine inapplicable | Manor: earlier opinion’s reference to Title VII framework mandates but‑for | Court: law‑of‑the‑case does not compel but‑for; issue reserved and decided for motivating‑factor |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (recognizing Title IX private cause of action for retaliation as a form of sex discrimination)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (holding Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Doe v. Univ. of the Sciences, 961 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (Third Circuit interprets Title IX’s "on the basis of sex" to support motivating‑factor causation)
- Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017) (articulating the elements of a Title IX retaliation claim)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (discussing but‑for causation and interpretation of statutory "because" language)
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying motivating‑factor analysis to university discipline when sex was a motivating factor)