2020 IL App (1st) 191328
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Jane Doe was sexually assaulted by a Lyft driver after hailing a ride via the Lyft app; she sued the driver, Lyft (direct negligence and vicarious liability), and Lyft’s background-check vendor.
- Doe pleaded Lyft was vicariously liable as the driver’s principal under the common‑carrier duty, which can impose vicarious liability even for intentional torts outside the scope of employment.
- Lyft moved to dismiss, arguing (1) sexual assault falls outside scope of employment and (2) 625 ILCS 57/25(e) (Transportation Network Providers Act) expressly declares TNCs are not common carriers.
- The trial court dismissed Doe’s vicarious‑liability counts, held §25(e) bars treating TNCs as common carriers, rejected Doe’s special‑legislation and three‑readings challenges, and certified two questions under Ill. S. Ct. R. 308.
- The appellate court answered: (1) §25(e) precludes imposing common‑carrier’s heightened duty and vicarious‑liability standards on TNCs; (2) §25(e) and the Act are not unconstitutional (special‑legislation challenge failed under rational‑basis review), and the three‑readings challenge is foreclosed by the enrolled‑bill doctrine.
- The court clarified §25(e) does not bar direct‑liability claims (negligent hiring/supervision, fraudulent marketing), which remain pending.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §25(e) preclude treating TNCs as common carriers (heightened duty and nondelegable vicarious liability)? | Doe: TNCs function like common carriers and should owe the same heightened, nondelegable duty (Green/Sanchez reasoning). | Lyft: §25(e) expressly declares TNCs are not common carriers; allowing common‑carrier treatment would nullify the statute. | Held: §25(e) precludes applying common‑carrier standards to TNCs. |
| Is §25(e) unconstitutional under the Illinois special‑legislation clause (art. IV, §13)? | Doe: Exempting TNCs but not taxis arbitrarily privileges TNCs and denies similarly situated victims equal protection. | Lyft: The distinction is rational—different business models (part‑time drivers, app‑based prearranged service, no vehicle control) and legislative goal of fostering TNC growth justify classification. | Held: Classification is rationally related to legitimate state interests (encouraging competition and relying on TNC safety features); §25(e) is constitutional. |
| Did the legislature violate the three‑readings requirement (art. IV, §8(d)) so the Act is invalid? | Doe: The House substituted wholly different text into SB 2774 after two readings, circumventing the three‑readings rule. | Lyft: The enrolled‑bill doctrine bars judicial inquiry once legislative officers certified the bill’s passage. | Held: Challenge foreclosed by the enrolled‑bill doctrine; courts must presume procedural compliance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Green v. Carlinville Community Unit School District No. 1, 381 Ill. App. 3d 207 (2008) (held school districts owe students same duty as common carriers while transporting them)
- Browne v. SCR Medical Transportation Services, Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d 642 (2005) (definition and characteristics of a common carrier)
- Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351 (1989) (scope‑of‑employment test for respondeat superior)
- Dew‑Becker v. Wu, 2020 IL 124472 (2020) (statutory‑construction principle: give effect to plain statutory language)
- Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315 (2005) (special‑legislation analysis and rational‑basis framework)
- Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997) (test: classifications must be based on reasonable differences related to legislative objective)
- Illinois Transportation Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing regulatory differences justified between taxis and TNCs)
- Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2018) (upholding different regulatory regimes for taxis and TNCs)
- Checker Cab Operators, Inc. v. Miami‑Dade County, 899 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2018) (similar federal treatment of regulatory distinctions)
- Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239 (1992) (enrolled‑bill doctrine and certification by legislative officers)
- Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312 (2003) (presumption of constitutionality and enrolled‑bill implications)
- Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179 (1952) (example of struck special legislation)