Doe v. Indian River School District
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16121
3rd Cir.2011Background
- The Indian River School Board has a long-standing practice of opening meetings with a prayer attended by students and the community.
- In 2004 the Board formalized this practice into a written Prayer Policy allowing rotating adult Board members to offer prayers, with allowances for silence and prohibitions on proselytizing.
- The policy and practice predominantly featured Christian language and references, despite the policy allowing other faiths and non-sectarian prayers.
- Plaintiffs filed §1983 challenges alleging Establishment Clause violations, arguing the policy coerces students and constitutes state endorsement of religion.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding Marsh v. Chambers-compatible legislative prayer analysis applied and that Marsh allowed the policy.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding Marsh does not apply; Lee v. Weisman framework governs school-prayer analysis, and the policy violates the Establishment Clause under Lemon and related tests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Marsh apply to a school board prayer policy? | Marsh applies to legislative-like bodies; Board is legislative-leaning and records show student presence. | Marsh history applies to legislative bodies and the Board’s prayer resembles legislative prayer. | Marsh does not apply; Lee framework governs. |
| Does the Prayer Policy violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon? | Policy is neutral but coercive; it lacks a secular purpose and/or its primary effect endorses religion. | Policy solemnifies meetings and allows nonsectarian prayers; no coercion proven. | Policy violates Lemon’s purpose/effect prongs. |
| Is there excessive entanglement with religion in the policy? | State involvement in drafting/reciting prayers creates entanglement. | Policy relies on board members’ discretion and rotation; no significant entanglement. | Excessive entanglement present; unconstitutional. |
| Does the policy’s content (primarily sectarian prayers) influence the analysis of primary effect? | Content is nonsectarian or inclusive; no religious endorsement. | Content largely Christian; thus endorses religion. | Primary effect endorses religion; unconstitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (Supreme Court 1962) (government-mandated school prayer unconstitutional)
- Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (Supreme Court 1963) (school Bible readings unconstitutional absent compelling basis)
- Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (Supreme Court 1992) (government-directed prayers in schools unconstitutional due to coercion risks)
- Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (Supreme Court 2000) (student-initiated prayer at games endorsed by school struck down)
- Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (Supreme Court 1983) (legislative prayer exception based on history and tradition)
- Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Ed., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (school boards differ from legislative bodies; Marsh not universally applicable)
- Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (military college prayer unconstitutional where state composes and delivers prayer)
- Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (history and context of prayer affecting endorsement analysis)
- Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (endorsement/ Lemon discussion and disclaimers relevance)
- Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (Supreme Court 1985) (Lemon test emphasis in school-prayer cases)