Doe v. Hobart and William Smith Colleges
546 F.Supp.3d 250
W.D.N.Y.2021Background
- Plaintiff (John Doe) was expelled by Hobart and William Smith Colleges (HWS) after being found responsible for sexually assaulting a classmate (Jane Roe) arising from an October 2018 encounter that Doe alleges was a consensual hookup.
- HWS retained CSC Investigations; investigator Tamara Chase prepared a report (allegedly omitting/excluding evidence, destroyed interview recordings, conducted follow-ups with complainants but not Doe) and HWS attorney Kellely Hodge served as sole adjudicator at the hearing.
- Plaintiff alleges exculpatory video showing Roe alert shortly after the encounter, testimonial inconsistencies, Roe’s attorney coaching answers at the hearing, and confrontational treatment of Plaintiff; Plaintiff appealed and alleges procedural defects including an improper document submitted on appeal.
- Plaintiff asserts Title IX (erroneous-outcome/gender-bias), breach of contract (implied student-university contract and specific policy provisions), promissory estoppel, and negligence (against individuals and respondeat superior against HWS).
- Defendants moved to dismiss; the court (W.D.N.Y.) (Judge Wolford) dismissed negligence claims against individual defendants and promissory estoppel, granted Hodge’s motion (terminated Hodge and Boerner), but allowed Plaintiff’s Title IX claim and breach of contract claim against HWS to proceed; breach of contract against Chase survives dismissal motion (authenticity dispute prevented consideration of contract exhibit).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of breach-of-contract claim against investigator Chase (third-party beneficiary) | Chase contracted with HWS; Plaintiff is third-party beneficiary of the Investigative Services Agreement | Chase submitted an investigative agreement to show no basis; authenticity disputed | Court could not consider Chase’s submitted (unauthenticated/incomplete) contract at Rule 12(b)(6); breach claim vs Chase survives dismissal motion |
| Negligence claim vs investigator Chase (duty) | Chase’s deficient/bias investigation created duty and increased risk of wrongful finding | No duty to plaintiff; Espinal exceptions do not apply; investigation did not "launch" an instrument of harm | Negligence claim dismissed—plaintiff failed to allege legal duty under Espinal exceptions |
| Negligence claim vs adjudicator Hodge (choice of law / tort v. contract) | By contract performance, Hodge assumed duty to act non-negligently | Choice-of-law clause in Fee Agreement governs; under Pennsylvania law gist-of-action bars tort claims arising from contractual duties | Negligence claim dismissed under Pennsylvania "gist of the action" doctrine; breach claim as to Hodge was abandoned by plaintiff and dismissed |
| Negligence and respondeat superior claims vs Boerner / HWS | Boerner (administrator) witnessed procedural failures and had power to prevent harm; HWS liable vicariously | New York law disallows negligent investigation/prosecution claims; no independent underlying tort survives | Negligence claims against Boerner and respondeat superior claim against HWS dismissed |
| Title IX erroneous-outcome claim vs HWS | Procedural irregularities, biased investigation/adjudication, and HWS’s history of OCR scrutiny create plausible inference of gender bias | Temporal distance of prior criticism and investigations makes bias inference implausible | Title IX claim survives plausibility review (Yusuf/Columbia/Menaker framework); allowed to proceed |
| Breach of contract claim vs HWS (student handbook/policy breaches) | HWS breached specific, concrete policy provisions (evidence gathering, adjudicator training, advisor participation rules, implied covenant) | Plaintiff failed to identify specific enforceable contract terms | Court finds Plaintiff alleged specific, concrete policy breaches; breach claim survives |
| Promissory estoppel vs HWS | Alternative theory to enforce university promises about disciplinary fairness | An enforceable implied contract exists between student and university; promissory estoppel inapplicable | Promissory estoppel dismissed because an enforceable contract exists |
Key Cases Cited
- Columbia Univ. v. 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (articulates Title IX pleading standard: specific facts to support a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination)
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (frames erroneous-outcome and selective-enforcement theories under Title IX)
- Menaker v. Hofstra Univ. 935 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (OCR scrutiny and public criticism can support plausible inference of gender bias)
- Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors 98 N.Y.2d 136 (N.Y. 2002) (limits when contractual duties give rise to tort duties to third parties)
- In re Lake George Tort Claims [citation="461 F. App'x 39"] (2d Cir. 2012) ("launching an instrument of harm" requires creation or exacerbation of a danger beyond pre-contract conditions)
- Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ. 633 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2011) (student–university relationship is contractual with enforceable terms in policies/handbooks)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applies and refines Twombly plausibility standard)