153 F. Supp. 3d 506
D. Mass.2015Background
- Doe, an Emerson College student, alleges she was raped at an off‑campus MIT fraternity party on Oct. 13, 2012; initial DNA testing showed no male DNA but did show female saliva. After later recalling involvement by an Emerson student ("Student A"), Doe reported Student A to Emerson and the police.
- Emerson investigated the rape allegation under its disciplinary procedures and concluded there was insufficient evidence by a preponderance standard to discipline Student A; Doe was dissatisfied and filed additional complaints and a Title IX complaint with the Department of Education.
- Doe also reported anonymous threatening messages and a separate March 1, 2013 street/ alley encounter she alleged involved Student A; Emerson investigated these reports and again found insufficient evidence to support discipline.
- Plaintiff sued Emerson and several administrators asserting Title IX (previously survived), negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The court previously dismissed claims against the college president and denied defendants' motion as to Title IX.
- The issue before the court was defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts Two–Four (negligence, NIED, IIED). The court granted judgment for defendants on all three state‑law counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Negligence — Emerson (duty/breach re: preventing assaults/off‑campus conduct) | Emerson had a duty (via publications/policies) to protect students and enforce rules; it breached that duty by failing to take reasonable precautions and follow policies. | Massachusetts law imposes no broad duty on colleges to police adult students off‑campus or prevent third‑party criminal acts; complaint fails to identify a specific, reasonable precaution Emerson could have taken. | Judgment for defendants — no legal duty or plausible breach alleged to support negligence against Emerson. |
| Negligence — Individual administrators | Administrators had duty to enforce policies and protect students; their conduct (insensitive interviews, failing to trace messages, discouraging formal complaint) breached that duty. | Massachusetts does not impose a common‑law duty on administrators to enforce university policies; complaint lacks specific negligent acts by individuals. | Judgment for defendants — allegations are generalized dissatisfaction, not specific negligent breaches. |
| Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) | Defendants’ negligence caused severe emotional distress and resulting physical manifestations. | NIED requires negligence plus objective, physical symptomatology; plaintiff pleads only emotional harm and relies on the underlying negligence claim (which fails). | Judgment for defendants — NIED fails because negligence claim fails and complaint alleges no objective physical symptoms. |
| Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) | Defendants’ conduct (handling of complaints, disclosures, investigative conduct) was extreme, outrageous, and intended or reckless as to causing severe distress. | IIED requires conduct beyond all bounds of decency; plaintiff’s allegations reflect dissatisfaction with procedures, not extreme or outrageous behavior. | Judgment for defendants — conduct alleged is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state IIED. |
Key Cases Cited
- Perez‑Acevedo v. Rivero‑Cubano, 520 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (Rule 12(c) standard compared to Rule 12(b)(6))
- R.G. Financial Corp. v. Vergara‑Nunez, 446 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 2006) (documents fairly incorporated into pleadings may be considered on Rule 12(c))
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard requires more than speculative allegations)
- Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289 (Mass. 1993) (no general duty to rescue or protect absent special relationship)
- Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 440 Mass. 195 (Mass. 2003) (duty to protect from third‑party criminal conduct requires special relationship and reasonable foreseeability)
- Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 389 Mass. 47 (Mass. 1983) (college may owe a duty to provide physical security where foreseeable dangers exist)
- Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540 (Mass. 1982) (elements of NIED under Massachusetts law)
- Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129 (Mass. 1993) (NIED requires objective symptomatology beyond upset or humiliation)
- Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 (Mass. 1976) (elements and very high standard for IIED)