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Doe v. District of Columbia
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108501
| D.D.C. | 2013
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Background

  • Robert and Carla Doe adopted twins (Wayne and Sara) who had histories of severe early-life trauma; after entering the Doe home the twins sexually abused younger adoptive siblings (Ann and Oliver) for years, undiscovered by the parents until 2004.
  • The Does notified CFSA in a September 27, 2004 letter; CFSA investigated in October 2004, including forensic interviews, and found signs of present danger and moderate risk though one investigator did not label the situation "immediate danger."
  • After multi‑day meetings and exchanges, CFSA Director Brenda Donald determined on October 20, 2004 that Ann, Oliver, and Sara were in immediate danger and authorized a one‑day removal by CFSA social workers (Ann and Oliver returned the next day; Sara remained in voluntary placement).
  • Plaintiffs sued the District, former Mayor Fenty, and individual CFSA employees under federal and D.C. law for claims including Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, First Amendment retaliation, assault/battery, IIED, negligence, misrepresentation, malicious prosecution, defamation, invasion of privacy, and failure to provide post‑adoption services.
  • The court considered cross motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings; it granted judgment to defendants on all claims, denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, and granted qualified immunity to individual defendants.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Fourth Amendment: Was the warrantless, one‑day removal an unreasonable seizure? Removal lacked probable cause/exigent circumstances and was unnecessary. CFSA reasonably believed children were in immediate danger based on multi‑source investigation and safety concerns; exigent circumstances warranted seizure. Court: No Fourth Amendment violation; exigent circumstances justified temporary removal.
Fifth Amendment (procedural due process): Did CFSA deprive parents of liberty without due process? CFSA failed to obtain court order or pre‑deprivation hearing before removing children. Extraordinary circumstances (imminent danger) permit removal with post‑deprivation process; CFSA provided notice and post‑remedy. Court: No procedural due process violation because exigency excused pre‑deprivation hearing; post‑deprivation remedies sufficed.
First Amendment retaliation: Did CFSA retaliate against Does for petitioning/complaining? Plaintiffs engaged in protected speech and CFSA retaliated by threats/removal, criminal referrals, cutting services, and pressuring relinquishment. Actions were protective and triggered by abuse reports; no causal nexus showing retaliation. Court: Plaintiffs failed to show causal link; claims dismissed.
State torts (assault/battery, IIED, negligence, negligent hiring/supervision, misrepresentation, malicious prosecution, defamation, invasion of privacy) Various torts based on the removal, alleged false allegations, inadequate services, and adoption‑period omissions. Removal was lawful and temporary; many claims are procedurally barred, unsupported, or lack proximate causation and necessary proof (including expert proof for standards). Court: Judgment for defendants on all tort claims (claims dismissed or conceded; many lacked evidence or legal basis).
Qualified immunity N/A (plaintiffs argue rights violated) Officials acted reasonably under unsettled law about exigency; conduct did not violate clearly established rights. Court: Officials entitled to qualified immunity; plaintiffs failed first and second prongs.

Key Cases Cited

  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment uses totality of circumstances)
  • Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parents’ liberty interest in care and custody of children)
  • Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (emergency removals permissible without predeprivation hearing in exigent circumstances)
  • Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (child seizure reasonable if court order, probable cause, or exigency)
  • Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (requirement for specific articulable evidence of imminent danger for removal)
  • Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001) (standards for emergency child removals)
  • Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1989) (exigent‑circumstances test for child removal)
  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (balancing test for procedural due process; notice and meaningful hearing)
  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (qualified immunity framework permitting court to address order of prongs)
  • Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (clarifies "clearly established" inquiry for qualified immunity)
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standards; must plead facts supporting plausible liability)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Doe v. District of Columbia
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Aug 1, 2013
Citation: 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108501
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2005-1060
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.