721 F.Supp.3d 682
M.D. Tenn.2024Background
- Plaintiffs (two minors, Jane Doe and Grace Roe, and their parents) sued Currey Ingram Academy, alleging sexual assault and harassment by another student while attending the Academy.
- Plaintiffs brought both federal claims under Title IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681) and multiple state-law claims including negligence, negligent supervision/retention, negligent training, and emotional distress claims.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the Title IX claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and argued that dismissal of federal claims required dismissal of the state-law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The central factual dispute was whether Currey Ingram Academy received "federal financial assistance" and could therefore be liable under Title IX; Plaintiffs alleged as such solely on the Academy's 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- Plaintiffs attempted, outside their complaint, to introduce additional evidence of federal assistance (specifically a Paycheck Protection Program loan), but failed to properly amend their complaint to include these facts.
- The Court dismissed the Title IX claims for lack of plausible factual allegations and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status qualify as "federal financial assistance" under Title IX? | Tax-exempt status/economic benefit is “federal assistance” sufficient for Title IX. | Only direct grants or assistance count; tax exemption is indirect and not "federal financial assistance." | No; tax-exempt status is not federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes. |
| Can Plaintiffs supplement their complaint’s factual allegations via evidence submitted with their opposition to the motion to dismiss? | Evidence of PPP loan shows school received federal funds and court may consider it. | New facts must be in an amended complaint, not in an opposition brief. | No; new factual allegations must be pled, not raised in response or via exhibits. |
| Should the court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal (Title IX) claims? | Court should retain jurisdiction or find independent basis. | No federal question or diversity; supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised. | Court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed state-law claims without prejudice. |
| Did the court treat the motion to dismiss as a challenge to jurisdiction or the merits? | Defendant attacked merits under the guise of jurisdiction. | Defendant challenged the merits, not jurisdiction. | Court treated it as a merits-based Rule 12(b)(6) motion, not a jurisdictional challenge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (standard for plausibility in pleading under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirements and plausibility standard)
- NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (Title IX applies only to entities directly receiving federal financial assistance)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (when to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of federal claims)
- Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (tax-exempt status and federal conditions on tax benefits)