300 A.3d 116
Md.2023Background
- Plaintiff John Doe, a gay, cisgender man, worked for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in data-analytics/business-platform roles; CRS initially enrolled then revoked spousal health benefits for Doe’s same-sex husband citing Catholic teaching.
- Doe sued in federal court under Title VII, the federal Equal Pay Act, and Maryland statutes: the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) and the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act (MEPEWA).
- The federal district court granted Doe summary judgment on his federal Title VII and EPA claims (relying on Bostock), but certified three Maryland-law questions to the Maryland Supreme Court about (1) whether MFEPA’s ban on sex discrimination covers sexual orientation, (2) the scope of MFEPA’s religious-entity exemption phrase “to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity,” and (3) whether MEPEWA’s ban on sex discrimination covers sexual orientation.
- MFEPA expressly lists sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity as separate protected categories; MEPEWA prohibits pay disparities based on sex and gender identity but does not mention sexual orientation.
- The Maryland Supreme Court addressed statutory interpretation principles, reviewed plain text and legislative history, and answered the certified questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MFEPA’s prohibition on sex discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation | Doe: Bostock shows sex discrimination includes sexual orientation; MFEPA’s sex ban therefore covers sexual orientation | CRS: MFEPA separately enumerates “sex” and “sexual orientation,” so sex does not subsume sexual orientation; plain text and history treat them as distinct | No. MFEPA’s prohibition on sex discrimination does not itself include sexual orientation; sexual orientation is covered because MFEPA separately enumerates it. |
| Whether MEPEWA’s prohibition on sex discrimination prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation | Doe: By parity with Bostock and federal law, MEPEWA’s sex-based pay ban should encompass sexual orientation | CRS: MEPEWA’s text expressly lists sex and gender identity but omits sexual orientation; that omission shows the General Assembly did not intend to cover sexual orientation | No. MEPEWA does not prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination; adding sexual orientation to MEPEWA would require express legislative action. |
| Meaning and scope of MFEPA’s religious-entity exemption phrase “to perform work connected with the activities of the religious entity” | Doe: Exemption ambiguous; should be read narrowly—coextensive with the First Amendment ministerial exception | CRS: Exemption should be broad—covers employment connected to any activities of the religious entity, including secular roles | Ambiguous text; narrowest reasonable reading: exemption applies only where the employee’s duties directly further the religious entity’s core mission(s). Courts must consider duty-level connection (direct vs indirect), entity size, and core missions; application to Doe’s facts left to the federal court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (U.S. Supreme Court holding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity)
- Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (ministerial exception bars certain employment claims against religious institutions)
- Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (further clarifying ministerial-exception factors focusing on employee’s functions)
- Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565 (2001) (discussing scope of religious-employer exemption under Maryland law)
- Chappell v. Southern Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483 (1990) (Maryland courts generally interpret MFEPA in harmony with federal Title VII absent contrary legislative intent)