Doe v. Brown University
209 F. Supp. 3d 460
D.R.I.2016Background
- Jane Doe, a Brown senior, admitted collaborating on a take-home midterm and specifically that parts of her answer to question #4 mirrored another student (T.L.).
- Brown followed its Academic Code: professor reported suspected misconduct; Case Administrator screened; Standing Committee held hearings for Jane Doe and T.L.; Jane Doe admitted collaboration at multiple stages.
- The Committee found Jane Doe violated the Academic Code; after learning of a prior plagiarism finding (from junior year), it recommended a semester suspension and restoration of the prior transcript notation; the Dean largely upheld the sanctions on appeal.
- Jane Doe graduated on time after taking courses at Rhode Island College; she then sued Brown and various administrators/employees asserting 13 counts (breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, promissory estoppel, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, privacy/unreasonable publicity, IIED, tortious interference, etc.).
- The district court treated defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a summary-judgment motion, allowed further submissions and oral argument, and granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims (and dismissed one claim under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Brown breach the Academic Code by procedural defects in the investigation/hearing? | Brown failed to provide documents, notice, advisor access, a fair investigation, and examination rights, so the Code was breached. | Brown followed the Code’s procedures (professor provided materials to Case Administrator; Dean screened; Committee held hearings; appeal considered). | No breach; no genuine dispute of material fact — admissions and procedures complied with the Code. |
| Was the sanction arbitrary or a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? | Sanction disproportionate, arbitrary, and violated implied covenant. | Sanction fit Code penalties and relied on prior violation; process was not arbitrary. | Sanction appropriate; no bad faith; implied-covenant claim fails. |
| Do plaintiff’s tort claims (negligence, negligent misrepresentation, privacy/unreasonable publicity) survive independent of contract claim? | Defendants’ conduct caused damages (e.g., disrupted graduation activities, disclosures). | No cognizable duty or actionable misrepresentations; no factual proof of improper disclosure or reliance; causation/damage lacking. | Tort claims fail: no legally cognizable duties met; negligent misrepresentation and privacy claims lack evidence; negligence claim fails. |
| Do intentional torts (IIED, tortious interference) survive? | Defendants’ conduct was extreme, outrageous, and caused severe emotional/physical harm; VP Klawunn interfered with contract. | Conduct was routine academic discipline process, not extreme; no sufficient physical symptomology; actions consistent with Code. | IIED and tortious-interference claims fail as matter of law; no extreme/outrageous conduct or required physical symptoms; appeal handling lawful. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gorman v. St. Raphael Academy, 853 A.2d 28 (R.I. 2004) (school–student relationship is contractual and courts must defer to school administration)
- Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 1998) (courts defer on academic-judgment matters)
- Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (U.S. 1985) (judicial review limited; only egregious departures from academic norms are actionable)
- Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997) (elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., 965 A.2d 429 (R.I. 2009) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing standard)
- Mallette v. Children’s Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995) (elements of negligent misrepresentation)
- Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (summary-judgment evidence-viewing standard)
- LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (nonmovant must show trial-worthy issue to defeat summary judgment)
- Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (specifies that evidence opposing summary judgment must have substance)