Doe v. Brown University, 943 F.3d 61

Background

Jane Doe, a Brown undergraduate, took a Public Health course in fall 2013; a TA noticed near-identical answers to a take-home exam question by Doe and another student (T.L.).
Doe admitted collaborating with T.L. multiple times (to the professor, to the deputy dean, in a written statement to the Committee, and at her hearing) but did not mark the exam as collaborative.
The Committee found Doe violated Brown's Academic Code; because this was a second offense, it imposed a one-semester suspension, transcript notations, parental notification, and restrictions on institutional letters of support; the appeal to Brown’s VP for Campus Life upheld the sanctions.
Doe transferred for her final semester, subsequently graduated, and sued Brown and three employees asserting breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and related torts, alleging procedural deficiencies, bias, and excessive sanctions.
The district court converted a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion, denied Doe’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery as futile, and granted summary judgment to defendants; Doe appealed only as to claims against Brown and its agents.
The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that (1) Doe’s repeated admissions and the unmarked collaborative work foreclosed any causal showing that procedural lapses changed the outcome and (2) Doe failed to present evidence of bad faith, arbitrary treatment, or prejudicial reliance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Breach of contract (failure to follow Code procedures: notice, advisor list, access to exam, witnesses)	Brown violated the Code’s procedural requirements and that those breaches caused her harsher sanctions	Brown complied with the Code in substance; Doe had access to exams, could have presented witnesses, and repeatedly admitted the conduct underlying the violation	Summary judgment for Brown — Doe’s admissions and unmarked collaboration defeat any causal link between procedural lapses and sanctions
Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing / arbitrary enforcement / bias	Brown acted in bad faith, applied collaboration policy inconsistently, and selectively punished Doe (and committee overlap showed predisposition)	The Code permits discretion; repeat offenses lawfully justify stiffer sanctions; no evidence of Committee prejudice or selective enforcement	Summary judgment for Brown — no evidence of bad faith, arbitrary action, or bias; repeat-offense differential explained by Code
Promissory estoppel; negligent misrepresentation; negligence	Brown’s promises of support induced reliance; misrepresentations caused harm; negligence in handling process caused damages	No promise excused dishonest conduct; no detrimental reliance shown; harm flowed from Doe’s admitted misconduct, not university negligence	Summary judgment for Brown — claims fail for lack of actionable promise, reliance, or causation
Denial of additional discovery under Rule 56(d)	Doe needed discovery (e.g., professor’s collaboration policy, treatment of other students) to oppose summary judgment	Additional discovery would be futile because the dispositive facts (admissions and unmarked answers) were already in the record	Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion; Doe failed to show how further discovery would change the outcome

Key Cases Cited

Gorman v. St. Raphael Acad., 853 A.2d 28 (R.I. 2004) (student–school relationship is contractual and schools have broad disciplinary discretion)
Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (handbooks construed by reasonable student expectations; schools get deference)
Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 1998) (interpretation of university contract terms under student reasonable expectations)
Petrarca v. Fidelity and Cas. Ins. Co., 884 A.2d 406 (R.I. 2005) (elements of breach of contract require contract, breach, and causation/damages)
Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (standard for a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
Hicks v. Johnson, 755 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 2014) (standards for Rule 56(d) showing to obtain additional discovery)