Doe v. Brandeis University, 533 F.Supp.3d 49

Background

Plaintiffs (Omori and John Doe), full-time undergraduates at Brandeis, paid for Spring 2020 in-person instruction, campus facilities, and higher on‑campus tuition.
In March 2020 Brandeis shifted all classes online, closed campus facilities, required students to leave campus, and offered prorated refunds for room and board but not tuition or other fees.
Plaintiffs filed a putative class action asserting breach of contract (express and implied), unjust enrichment, and conversion seeking refunds for the lost in‑person services and alleging online instruction costs less per credit.
Defendant moved to dismiss; Doe moved to proceed under pseudonym. The court considered whether claims were barred as educational malpractice or by disclaimers, and whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion.
The court denied dismissal as to breach of contract (Counts I & II) and unjust enrichment (Count III), but dismissed conversion (Count IV). The court allowed Doe to proceed pseudonymously for now.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are claims barred as educational malpractice / academic freedom?	Claims challenge loss of in‑person services, not quality of instruction.	Switching to online implicates academic judgment and is nonjusticiable.	Not barred—claims seek refund for non‑delivery of promised in‑person services, an objective contract issue.
Breach of contract: Did Brandeis’s publications and course listings create a contractual right to in‑person instruction?	University’s bulletins, course locations, and higher on‑campus tuition created a reasonable expectation of in‑person instruction.	University reserved right to change offerings; no absolute promise of in‑person instruction.	Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a contract; dismissal denied as to breach—disclaimer not dispositive at pleading stage.
Unjust enrichment: Is it barred because an adequate contractual remedy exists?	Pleads unjust enrichment alternatively if no contract; conferred benefit (tuition) and retention is inequitable.	Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law (breach of contract), so unjust enrichment is improper.	Denied—unjust enrichment adequately pleaded as an alternative and retention of benefit plausibly inequitable.
Conversion: Can plaintiffs claim conversion of tuition payments or of the right to in‑person education?	Tuition paid for in‑person services was wrongfully retained; seeks refund of prorated portion.	No specific fund or possessory interest alleged; rights to education are not personal property.	Dismissed—money must be traceable to a specific fund and intangible educational rights cannot support conversion.

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: plausibility)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard: plausibility)
Ocasio‑Hernandez v. Fortuño‑Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (pleading plausibility and drawing reasonable inferences)
Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing educational malpractice from failure to provide promised service)
Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2009) (elements of unjust enrichment)
Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 865 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (party with adequate legal remedy cannot recover in unjust enrichment)
Third Nat’l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 380 (Mass. 1983) (conversion requires wrongful exercise of control over another’s personal property)
Salerno v. Fla. Southern Coll., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (tuition refund claims: conversion requires specific fund)
Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997) (school publications and handbooks can form contractual terms)
DMP v. Fay School, 933 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D. Mass. 2013) (recognizing contractual relationship between private school and student)
Bose Corp. v. Ejaz, 732 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2013) (elements required to plead breach of contract)