Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp.
151 A.3d 841
Conn.2016Background
- John Doe sued the Boy Scouts of America alleging childhood sexual abuse and brought claims in state court.
- Central legal question: whether the 30-year limitations period for childhood sexual abuse (Gen. Stat. § 52-577d) governs Doe’s claims or the 2-year negligence limitation (Gen. Stat. § 52-584) applies.
- A majority of this court (opinion announcing judgment) concluded that § 52-577d’s thirty-year period applied to Doe’s claims.
- The Boy Scouts filed a motion for reconsideration en banc, arguing the court overlooked Greco v. United Technologies Corp., which the defendant said required the opposite result.
- The court denied the motion for reconsideration en banc; Justices Zarella, Espinosa, and Robinson dissented from that denial, with Zarella explaining why Greco should control.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which statute of limitations governs Doe’s claims: the 30-year § 52-577d or the 2-year § 52-584? | § 52-577d’s 30‑year period applies to actions for personal injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse, so Doe’s claims fall within that longer period. | § 52-584’s 2‑year negligence limitation governs negligence claims; Greco shows that when a later statute expressly preempts certain statutes but omits others, omission is strong evidence the legislature did not intend to preempt the omitted provisions. | Majority (in the earlier judgment) applied § 52-577d’s 30‑year period to Doe’s claims. The court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration en banc; a dissenting opinion argued Greco requires granting reconsideration and reaching the opposite result. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp., 323 Conn. 303, 147 A.3d 104 (Conn. 2016) (opinion announcing judgment applying § 52-577d’s thirty‑year period; denial of reconsideration en banc challenged)
- Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 890 A.2d 1269 (Conn. 2006) (holds that when a statute expressly preempts certain limitations statutes but omits others, the omission is strong evidence the legislature did not intend to preempt the omitted statutes)