Doe v. Boy Scouts of America Corp., SC19516

Plaintiff (John Doe) sued The Boy Scouts of America alleging injuries from sexual abuse by a scout leader and related negligence and CUIPA claims; trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and awarded damages.
The Connecticut Supreme Court issued a multi-justice opinion: Chief Justice Rogers (judgment opinion) would reverse and remand for a new trial; Justices Eveleigh and McDonald would affirm; Justices Zarella, Espinosa and Robinson concurred in parts and dissented in part.
Justice Zarella (joined by Espinosa and Robinson) concurs in parts I and VI but dissents from part V, arguing the 30-year limitations statute (§52-577d) should not apply to negligence/recklessness claims.
Central procedural/legal dispute: whether §52-577d (30-year limit for personal injury from sexual abuse) displaces the ordinary two-year negligence statute (§52-584) when the defendant is a non-perpetrator alleged to have been negligent.
Zarella reasons from statutory text, the structure of Connecticut limitation statutes, legislative history, and some out-of-state decisions that §52-577d was intended to govern intentional-perpetrator claims only; under that view the negligence claim is time-barred by §52-584.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §52-577d’s 30-year limitations period (for injuries "caused by sexual abuse") applies to negligence/recklessness claims against nonperpetrators	§52-577d’s broad "caused by sexual abuse" language extends the 30-year period to negligence claims; omission of §52-584 does not imply exclusion	§52-577d was drafted to displace §52-577 (intentional torts) only; omission of §52-584 shows the legislature did not intend to extend §52-577d to negligence claims	Justice Zarella: §52-577d applies only to intentional-perpetrator claims; negligence claims are governed by §52-584 (two years) and here would be time-barred. (Majority disagreed and applied §52-577d.)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s requested jury instruction that BSA could only be liable for negligence if its conduct created or increased risk of harm from the perpetrator	Plaintiff: BSA can be liable under broader negligence principles; instruction unnecessary or incorrect	Defendant: BSA’s liability requires proof that its conduct created/increased risk from the specific perpetrator; requested instruction was correct	Justices Zarella, Espinosa and Robinson agreed the court erred in denying that instruction; the majority joined part I and concluded reversal and remand for new trial on instructional error grounds.

Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 539 (Conn. 2012) (statutory interpretation principle: avoid readings that create conflicts among statutes)
Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477 (Conn. 1967) (discussing §52-577 as general limitation for intentional torts)
Almonte v. New York Med. Coll., 851 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1994) (federal court concluded §52-577d applies to negligence claims; influential in subsequent CT trial courts)
Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198 (8th Cir. 2011) (construing a statute phrased "caused by childhood sexual abuse" and rejecting extension to nonperpetrators)
State ex rel. Heart of Am. Council v. McKenzie, 484 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. 2016) (interpreting similar statute to apply to perpetrators and rejecting broad nonperpetrator application)