Doe v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, The, 1:20-cv-03857

Plaintiff Jane Doe alleges that on December 2, 2019 Foreman HS staff (teacher Laura Bubel and classroom assistants Angel Lebron and Teresa Dirosa) forcibly took her non‑verbal son F.H., who has Down syndrome, from her while she was escorting him out of school.
The defendants allegedly physically restrained and dragged F.H., isolated him in an empty classroom for about five hours while he screamed and cried, and denied Doe’s repeated requests to take him home.
F.H. had exhibited panic attacks and emotional fragility since starting high school; Doe had met with school officials twice before to discuss his condition.
Board policy (allegedly) prohibited physical restraints on students with disabilities absent express IEP authorization; F.H.’s IEP did not authorize restraints.
Plaintiff pleaded willful and wanton conduct (an aggravated form of negligence) against the individuals and vicarious liability against the Board; defendants moved to dismiss that count under Rule 12(b)(6), conceding the basic negligence elements and vicarious liability but arguing the pleadings fail to show deliberate intent or conscious disregard.
The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the amended complaint plausibly alleges facts that could support a jury finding of willful and wanton conduct and noting affirmative defenses (e.g., Tort Immunity Act) were not raised as grounds for dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the complaint plausibly pleads willful and wanton conduct (deliberate intent to harm or conscious disregard for F.H.’s welfare)	Doe: facts show forcible removal from mother, repeated restraint despite child’s distress and mother’s objections, prior notice of child’s fragility, and violation of restraint policy	Defs: allegations are insufficient to show deliberate intent or conscious disregard to meet willful and wanton standard	Court: Denied 12(b)(6). Allegations and reasonable inferences suffice to create a jury question on willful and wanton conduct
Whether the Board can be held vicariously liable for employees’ conduct	Doe: Board is vicariously liable under respondeat superior for employees acting within scope of employment	Defs: did not contest vicarious liability at motion stage	Court: Noted concession; vicarious liability would attach if employees’ torts proved
Whether potential affirmative defenses (e.g., Tort Immunity Act) bar the claim at pleading stage	Doe: not applicable at motion to dismiss stage	Defs: intended to assert immunities as affirmative defenses	Court: Rejected using affirmative defenses to dismiss; such defenses operate as affirmative and were not asserted as a dismissal ground

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: allegations must state a plausible claim)
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (willful and wanton is an aggravated form of negligence)
Doe‑3 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 973 N.E.2d 880 (to recover for willful and wanton conduct plaintiff must allege deliberate intent or conscious disregard)
Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351 (employer vicarious liability when torts committed within scope of employment)
Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (whether conduct is willful and wanton is generally for the jury)
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (existence of possible affirmative defenses does not render a claim facially invalid on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, 394 Ill. 569 (common‑law formulation of willful and wanton/reckless disregard)
Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632 (on a motion to dismiss, court accepts complaint allegations as true)