Doe No. 3 v. Nur-Ul-Islam Academy, Inc.
217 So. 3d 85
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Jane Doe No. 3 sued Nur-Ul-Islam of South Florida, Nur-Ul-Islam Academy, Inc., and Kem Hussain for sexual abuse and related torts arising from alleged abuse by a teacher in 2004 while Doe was a student.
- Doe alleged she reported the abuse the same day to an Academy official and that the Academy retaliated, shunned her, failed to report to parents, and returned her to the teacher’s classroom, causing continued harm and intimidation into silence.
- Complaint asserted negligence, mental and emotional child abuse, and negligent hiring/retention/supervision.
- Defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice on statute-of-limitations grounds; the trial court dismissed with prejudice.
- On appeal, the Fourth District reviewed de novo and focused on whether the statute-of-limitations defense was apparent on the face of the complaint (the "four corners" rule).
- Court concluded the complaint did not establish accrual dates (Doe’s birthdate/parents’ knowledge not alleged) and that accrual for a minor is delayed until a parent knew or should have known (or the minor turned 18), so dismissal with prejudice was improper; the dismissal was reversed and remanded (dismissal without prejudice permitted on remand).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a statute-of-limitations defense may be resolved on a motion to dismiss where accrual facts are not alleged | Doe: dismissal improper because accrual facts (age, parents’ knowledge) are not in the complaint and an affirmative defense must appear on the face of the complaint to support dismissal | Defs: statute-of-limitations is apparent and dismissal with prejudice is proper; unfair to let plaintiff’s failure to plead prevent dismissal | Court: Affirmative defenses can be decided on a motion to dismiss only if apparent on the complaint’s face; here accrual facts are not alleged, so dismissal was improper |
| When does a minor’s cause of action accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes | Doe: accrual is delayed until parents knew or reasonably should have known (or child reaches majority) under Drake and Rule 1.210(b) | Defs: accrual/delayed discovery doctrines should not apply or have been superseded by statutory tolling/repose provisions | Court: Agrees accrual is delayed until parent/guardian knew or the minor turned 18; this accrual rule is distinct from delayed-discovery doctrine and applicable here |
| Whether statutory tolling/repose (section 95.051) supplants accrual rule from Drake | Defs: 1990 amendment creates tolling/repose that replaces Drake and requires pleading specific tolling qualifications | Doe: tolling statutes govern different doctrine (tolling) and do not displace accrual rule; later statutes (e.g., §95.11(9)) support unlimited time for certain child sexual battery claims | Court: Statute addresses tolling/repose, not accrual; later legislative change providing unlimited period for certain child sexual battery claims undercuts application of repose here |
| Effect of plaintiff’s failure to plead age or parents’ knowledge | Doe: absence of those facts favors plaintiff because the defense is not shown on the face of the complaint | Defs: plaintiff shouldn’t benefit from omitting facts that would defeat her claim | Court: Where accrual facts are missing from the complaint, defendants must pursue summary judgment or trial; dismissal on statute-of-limitations at pleading stage is improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Frank v. Campbell Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 351 So.2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (affirmative defenses must appear on face of complaint to support dismissal)
- Heamdon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2000) (delayed discovery doctrine delays accrual until plaintiff knows or should know)
- Drake By & Through Fletcher v. Island Community Church, Inc., 462 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (statute of limitations for minors does not run until parent knew or should have known)
- Burgess v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 126 So.3d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (standard of review for dismissals with prejudice is de novo)
- Ryan v. Lobo De Gonzalez, 841 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (discussion of delayed discovery in childhood sexual abuse cases)
- Minor v. Brunetti, 43 So.3d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (issue better addressed on summary judgment or at trial when dismissal relies on matters beyond the complaint)