Doe ex rel. Doe v. Rankin County School District
2015 Miss. LEXIS 552
Miss.2015Background
- Jane Doe (through her father) sued Rankin County School District (RCSD) after Jane was sexually assaulted on an RHS school bus by another student (pseudonym Bart).
- Discovery revealed Bart had prior sexual misconduct incidents and a 2007 sexual-battery charge that resulted in a transfer from his prior school.
- RCSD answered and included MTCA discretionary-function immunity as an affirmative defense but moved for summary judgment on that basis 19 months later; the trial court granted summary judgment.
- Doe moved for reconsideration arguing RCSD waived immunity by actively participating in litigation and unreasonably delaying assertion of the defense; the Court of Appeals reversed on waiver grounds while finding immunity under the older two-part public-function test.
- The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that Brantley changed the discretionary-function analysis, concluded RCSD did not waive immunity, and remanded for reconsideration under Brantley’s test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCSD is entitled to discretionary-function immunity under MTCA §11-46-9(1)(d) | RCSD’s actions were ministerial or negligent — immunity should not apply | RCSD’s duties over student conduct and safety are discretionary functions | Remanded: analysis must follow Brantley’s governmental-function/ministerial-duty framework rather than the old two-part public-policy test |
| Whether RCSD waived its immunity defense by participating in discovery and delaying assertion | RCSD actively participated and unreasonably delayed 16–19 months, so immunity waived | RCSD’s discovery (sensitive youth records etc.) justified reasonable time to develop the immunity defense | RCSD did not waive immunity; remand permitted RCSD to reassert defense under Brantley (majority). Concurring judge would find waiver procedurally barred by plaintiff’s late-raise; dissent would find waiver as matter of law |
| Proper test for discretionary-function immunity (two-part public-policy vs. Brantley) | Plaintiff urged trial court’s prior application of public-function test was incorrect under new law | RCSD argued for application of proper legal standard (Brantley) on review | Court held Brantley displaced the former two-part public-policy test; courts must identify the broad governmental function and then any narrower ministerial duties imposed by statute/regulation |
| Whether remand is required for application of Brantley | Plaintiff opposed remand arguing waiver should dispose; urged denial of immunity | RCSD sought review and application of Brantley standard | Court reversed COA and trial court and remanded for proceedings applying Brantley; directed consideration of whether any narrower ministerial duty applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So.3d 1106 (Miss. 2014) (adopted new test: immunity applies to governmental functions; examine narrower statutory ministerial duties)
- Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Montgomery, 80 So.3d 789 (Miss. 2012) (articulated the older two-part public-function test)
- Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 129 So.3d 132 (Miss. 2013) (precedent leading toward Brantley’s rejection of the public-policy test)
- MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167 (Miss. 2006) (delay and active participation can waive affirmative defenses)
- Estate of Grimes ex rel. Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365 (Miss. 2008) (MTCA immunity waived after prolonged participation and unexplained delay)
- Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So.2d 1028 (Miss. 2003) (immunity is entitlement not to stand trial; should be resolved early)