Doe 2 v. John Rosa, 795 F.3d 429

From 2005 through mid-2007 Louis “Skip” ReVille sexually abused two minor boys (Doe 2 and Doe 3); he had prior allegations from a 2002 camper ("Camper Doe").
In April 2007 Camper Doe’s father called The Citadel; The Citadel’s general counsel, Mark Brandenburg, investigated and identified ReVille as the likely counselor, then met with ReVille. President John W. Rosa’s office received reports about the matter, but Rosa did not refer the complaint to law enforcement.
The Does allege Brandenburg and Rosa took steps to conceal the Camper Doe complaint (e.g., limited disclosures to the Board, withdrawing appeal of unemployment challenge, omissions from records and Clery reporting), and that concealment allowed ReVille to resume molesting the Does in mid-2007.
The Does sued Rosa under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a substantive due process violation under the state-created-danger theory.
The district court granted summary judgment for Rosa, holding DeShaney and Fourth Circuit precedent foreclose liability for failure to prevent harm from a preexisting private actor. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rosa’s conduct created or substantially increased the danger posed by ReVille, giving rise to § 1983 liability under the state-created-danger doctrine	Rosa’s alleged concealment and failure to report Camper Doe’s allegations were affirmative acts (or caused increased risk) that allowed ReVille to continue abusing the Does	Rosa’s actions (or inaction) did not create or increase the danger; ReVille’s abuse preexisted Rosa’s knowledge, so any failure to act is noncognizable under DeShaney/Pinder	Held for Rosa: no § 1983 liability because the danger was preexisting and Rosa did not create or materially increase it
Whether failing to follow internal policies, misreporting to The Citadel Board, or omitting reports constitute the necessary "affirmative acts" under the state-created-danger doctrine	Policy violations, misrepresentations, and omissions were effectively affirmative steps that increased risk and concealed danger	These are omissions or passive failures to act, not the kind of direct, affirmative conduct that the doctrine requires	Held for Rosa: alleged policy breaches/record omissions are omissions, not the sort of affirmative conduct that triggers due-process liability

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (Due Process Clause generally does not impose a duty to protect individuals from private actors; liability may arise when the state creates or substantially increases danger or has custody)
Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995) (clarifies that liability requires state actor affirmative conduct that creates or enhances danger; mere failure to act is insufficient)
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizes bodily-integrity claims under § 1983 for sexual abuse in school settings)
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (school administrators may be liable under § 1983 for policies showing reckless indifference to known sexual abuse)
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (a state actor cannot be liable for a danger that preexisted the actor’s conduct)