Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointments
233 Ariz. 119
Ariz.2013Background
- Arizona Constitution (Art. 6, §§ 36–37) created a merit-selection Commission on Appellate Court Appointments that must nominate "not less than three" candidates for each appellate vacancy; governor appoints from nominees.
- In 2013 the legislature enacted H.B. 2600 requiring the Commission to submit "at least five persons" unless an applicant is rejected by a two‑thirds vote, effectively imposing both a minimum of five nominees and a supermajority rule to submit fewer.
- Four commissioners (individually) filed a special action seeking a declaratory/injunctive ruling that H.B. 2600 is unconstitutional and to enjoin the Commission from applying it; the Commission was a nominal defendant.
- The Court accepted special-action jurisdiction because the dispute raised pure legal issues of statewide importance and required prompt resolution; no factual record was necessary.
- Petitioners asserted individualized injury: H.B. 2600 changes how individual commissioners’ votes count (raising the threshold to block nominees), and compels them to follow a statute they contend conflicts with their constitutional oath.
- The Court concluded the statute conflicts with the constitution, enjoined enforcement, and awarded reasonable attorney’s fees under the private‑attorney‑general doctrine (limited to time on successful claims).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petitioners have standing to challenge H.B. 2600 | Petitioners: Individual commissioners suffer particularized injury because the statute alters how their votes operate and compels unconstitutional action | State: Petitioners lack standing; analogous to legislators in Bennett who couldn’t bring organizational claims | Held: Petitioners have prudential standing—statute changes individual voting power and affects oath duties, so injury is particularized |
| Whether this Court should exercise special-action jurisdiction | Petitioners: Case raises pure legal questions of statewide importance requiring prompt resolution | State: Case should be filed in superior court to develop record | Held: Court accepted special-action jurisdiction—no disputed facts and immediate resolution required |
| Whether H.B. 2600 is a permissible procedural supplement or conflicts with the constitution | Petitioners: H.B. 2600 directly conflicts with Art. 6 nomination scheme (minimum three nominees, majority control to add nominees) | State: The change is a procedural supplement, comparable to permissible legislative regulation in Direct Sellers Ass’n v. McBrayer | Held: H.B. 2600 conflicts with the constitution; it materially alters the balance of power and imposes unauthorized supermajority rules, so it is unconstitutional |
| Whether any part of H.B. 2600 is severable | Petitioners: Entire provision should be invalid because multiple parts conflict with constitutional provisions governing commissions | State: (did not argue severability of challenged provisions) | Held: The challenged provisions are not severable; related changes to trial‑court commissions and voting‑record requirements also conflict with the constitution |
Key Cases Cited
- Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 989 P.2d 751 (1999) (special-action jurisdiction and extraordinary-writ principles)
- Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 81 P.3d 311 (2003) (standing limits on individual legislators bringing organizational claims)
- Turley v. Bolin, 27 Ariz. App. 345, 554 P.2d 1288 (1976) (statute conflicting with voter‑enacted constitutional timing provision struck down)
- Direct Sellers Ass’n v. McBrayer, 109 Ariz. 3, 503 P.2d 951 (1971) (legislation may supplement constitutional provisions if it reasonably advances purpose and does not unreasonably hinder them)
- Windes v. Frohmiller, 38 Ariz. 557, 3 P.2d 275 (1931) (constitution prevails over conflicting statutes)
- State v. Roscoe, 185 Ariz. 68, 912 P.2d 1297 (1996) (distinguishing permissible procedural legislation from measures that infringe voter‑enacted constitutional provisions)
- Ingram v. Shumway, 164 Ariz. 514, 794 P.2d 147 (1990) (special action appropriate when prompt, final resolution is required)
- Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 775 P.2d 521 (1989) (private‑attorney‑general doctrine for awarding fees)
- Merrill v. Phelps, 52 Ariz. 526, 84 P.2d 74 (1938) (declaratory relief appropriate to resolve conflicts between statutory and constitutional authority)