Doan, Ex Parte Dustin
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 812
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- Ex parte Doan concerns whether the Brazos County Attorney and the Travis County Attorney are the same party for collateral estoppel in a theft case arising after a probation-revocation proceeding.
- The Court of Appeals held the two county prosecutors are not the same party under state law, allowing collateral estoppel to bar Travis County from prosecuting Doan.
- This Court discussed federal versus state law for double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, but did not overrule Tarver; it held jeopardy does not attach at probation-revocation proceedings.
- The majority treated the issue as state-law collateral-estoppel, potentially implying a broader rule about party identity across prosecutions.
- Dissenting views (Keller) urge expressly overruling Tarver and treat the two county prosecutors as different parties under state law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Brazos and Travis County Attorneys the same party under state law? | Doan | Court/State | Not the same party; collateral estoppel does not apply under state law. |
| Does double jeopardy bar a later prosecution after a favorable probation-revocation ruling? | Court buttressed by Tarver; collateral estoppel applies under federal standards | Tarver should be overruled; jeopardy does not attach in probation revocation | Double jeopardy not implicated because jeopardy does not attach to probation-revocation proceedings. |
| Should Tarver be overruled to align Texas law with other jurisdictions on collateral estoppel in probation-revocation contexts? | Tarver should be overruled to reject its reasoning | Tarver remains valid authority | Dissent would overrule Tarver; majority does not overrule Tarver. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (collateral estoppel in probation-revocation context (double jeopardy))
- Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (decentralized state government supports treating DPS and local prosecutor as different parties)
- Brabson v. State, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (decentralized power supports separate parties for collateral-estoppel)
- Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1970) (double jeopardy distinctions between sovereigns; non-application to probation revocation)
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1970) (collateral estoppel in double-jeopardy context; limits in probation-revocation)