DM Arbor Ct v. City of Houston, 988 F.3d 215

Hurricane Harvey flooded large parts of Houston, including the low-income Arbor Court Apartments located in a floodplain/floodway; Arbor Court sought permits to repair Harvey damage.
Houston’s Floodplain Ordinance requires permits for substantial repairs in flood-prone areas and allows denial if permitting would create danger to life or property; the Public Works Director denied Arbor Court’s permits citing flood risk and advised administrative appeals were available.
Arbor Court sued in federal court asserting takings and other constitutional claims before pursuing the City’s full administrative appeal; the district court dismissed the suit without prejudice as unripe for lack of a final agency decision.
After dismissal but while this appeal was pending, Arbor Court finally exhausted the City’s administrative process and the City Council denied the permits.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed (1) whether the district court correctly dismissed the case as unripe at the time, and (2) whether the case could become ripe on appeal because the Council acted after the district-court judgment.
The court affirmed that the claims were unripe when the district court ruled but held that post-judgment events (the Council denial) removed the prudential ripeness impediment, so the case ripened on appeal and must be remanded for merits proceedings; it also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint as premised on futility.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were Arbor Court’s claims ripe when the district court dismissed?	Arbor: the Director’s action (and prior actions) made the claims ripe.	City: not ripe until final decision by City Council; Arbor failed to exhaust appeals.	Not ripe at district-court time; dismissal was correct.
May an appellate court consider events occurring after the district-court decision when assessing ripeness?	Arbor: yes — post-judgment events that remove prudential impediments should be considered and can ripen the case on appeal.	City: discretion exists but court should decline because remand would reward Arbor’s delay.	Appellate courts should consider intervening events for prudential ripeness; the case ripened on appeal and must be remanded.
Does Knick eliminate the final-decision requirement from Williamson County?	Arbor: Knick removed state-litigation bar but does not negate the finality principle relevant here.	City: finality remains required; not ripe without Council decision.	Knick did not eliminate the final-decision requirement; finality remains a prudential ripeness condition.
Was denial of leave to amend (to add takings claim) proper when premised on futility due to non-ripeness?	Arbor: sought leave to reassert takings claim once ripe.	City: amendment was futile while claim unripe.	Denial vacated because it rested on futility tied to ripeness; district court should reconsider in light of ripeness.

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (takings claims require a final decision by the government before ripeness analysis).
Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (overruled Williamson’s state-litigation requirement but left finality requirement intact).
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing; appellate courts may consider later events).
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987) (appellate ripeness may consider events after the trial court’s decision).
Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of takings claim where plaintiff failed to pursue available administrative appeals).
John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2000) (related claims require final administrative action for ripeness).
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (characterizing Williamson County’s finality requirement as prudential).