Dixon v. the State
341 Ga. App. 255
Ga. Ct. App.2017Background
- Defendant Eric Dixon was convicted of one count of aggravated child molestation and four counts of child molestation based on testimony of a female victim who was 15 at trial describing multiple sexual acts beginning when she was about 9–10 and including oral contact and threats by Dixon.
- The State introduced testimony from another alleged victim, W.T., who testified that Dixon sexually abused him (touching, oral and anal sex) between ages 6–11 while Dixon was in a relationship with W.T.’s mother, and that Dixon threatened him to keep silent.
- The defense challenged admission of W.T.’s testimony as uncorroborated and unduly prejudicial under OCGA §§ 24-4-413/414 and OCGA § 24-4-403; the trial court admitted it and gave a limiting instruction.
- Dixon also moved for a new trial under OCGA § 5-5-21 arguing the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the victims were not credible and testimony contained inconsistencies; the trial court denied the motion.
- On appeal Dixon argued (1) erroneous admission of other-act sexual-assault/child-molestation evidence and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of other-act evidence under OCGA §§ 24-4-413/414 | State: prior-act testimony admissible to show propensity, motive, similarity, and to rebut credibility attacks | Dixon: W.T.’s testimony was uncorroborated, not reported/investigated, and thus inadmissible | Admission affirmed: uncorroborated testimony may suffice; jury could find prior act by preponderance and admission proper |
| 403 balancing (unfair prejudice) | State: probative value high given credibility attacks, lack of physical evidence, similarity and need | Dixon: testimony was highly prejudicial and its probative value was substantially outweighed by prejudice | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; similarity, prosecutorial need, remoteness, and limiting instruction supported admission |
| Requirement of corroboration for other-act evidence | State: new Evidence Code mirrors federal rules; corroboration not required to admit other-act evidence | Dixon: other-act testimony functionally required corroboration (or formal investigation/charges) | Court: corroboration/charges not required for admission under OCGA §§ 24-4-413/414; noted unresolved question re: uncorroborated accomplice testimony but not decided here |
| Motion for new trial — weight of the evidence under OCGA § 5-5-21 | Dixon: verdict strongly against weight of evidence; victims not credible | State: jury weighed credibility; trial court should defer to jury; denial proper | Affirmed: trial court presumed to have exercised discretion as 13th juror; no positive evidence it failed to do so and appellate courts will not overturn exercise of that discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506 (standard for sufficiency and deference to jury credibility)
- Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414 (eyewitness testimony sufficient to prove other-act under OCGA § 24-4-404(b))
- Steele v. State, 337 Ga. App. 562 (OCGA §§ 24-4-413/414 supersede § 24-4-404(b) and create presumption of admissibility)
- Dority v. State, 335 Ga. App. 83 (same; guidance on admitting prior sexual-offense evidence)
- Eubanks v. State, 332 Ga. App. 568 (application of § 24-4-403 balancing for other-act sexual evidence)
- Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (discussing Rule 403 balancing and new Evidence Code)
- Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65 (discussion of relevance vs. probative value in OCGA § 24-4-403 analysis)
- Gunn v. State, 300 Ga. App. 229 (similarity of child sexual-abuse acts across victims supports admission)