Dixon v. District of Columbia
753 F. Supp. 2d 6
D.D.C.2010Background
- MPD General Order 303.1 provides automatic arrest and possible criminal penalties for speeding more than 30 mph over the limit when stopped by an officer.
- By contrast, speeding captured by the District's Automated Traffic Enforcement (ATE) System results in a civil summons rather than arrest.
- ATE was established in 1999 under D.C. Code § 50-2209.01 and allows a registered owner to contest the infraction.
- Dixon was arrested for speeding >30 mph over the limit on February 15, 2008; Phung was arrested for speeding >30 mph over the limit on November 27, 2009.
- Plaintiffs allege thousands of comparable motorists were subject to arrest via officer stops but only civil penalties via ATE, creating a purported equal protection violation.
- Plaintiffs filed the complaint on February 24, 2010, seeking relief from the District’s disparate treatment between the two speeding-enforcement methods.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the two groups similarly situated for equal protection | Dixon/Phung allege comparable treatment between officer arrest and ATE citation. | Arrest vs. non-arrest inherently distinguishable; not similarly situated. | They are not similarly situated; dismissal warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (probable cause for warrantless arrest affects legality)
- City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection requires similarly situated persons be treated alike)
- Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C.Cir.1996) (equal protection analysis in context of DC corrections)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (facially plausible pleadings required to survive Rule 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (threadbare legal conclusion insufficient; claims must rise above speculation)
- Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C.Cir.1994) (pleading standards require grounds of entitlement to relief)
- Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605 (D.C.Cir.1979) (favoring plaintiff in Rule 12(b)(6) evaluation)
- Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (due process extends Equal Protection principles to DC via Fifth Amendment)
- Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (D.C.Cir.1984) (analysis of equal protection in DC governmental actions)