Dix, Wade Eugene v. State
PD-1037-15
| Tex. App. | Sep 18, 2015Background
- Appellant Wade Eugene Dix pleaded guilty in March 2013 to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, with deferred adjudication and four years of community supervision including a no-contact condition.
- The State moved to adjudicate guilt in August 2013 alleging no-contact violations and other supervision breaches; the court delayed adjudication but imposed 60 days in jail as therapy.
- In April 2014 the State filed a second motion to adjudicate with new and prior allegations, including several no-contact dates and failure to pay fees.
- The trial court found true three no-contact violations (two in July 2013 and March 30, 2014) and the other allegations; it adjudicated guilt and imposed four years’ imprisonment.
- Dix appealed arguing insufficiency of the evidence and collateral estoppel; the court affirmed, concluding sufficient evidence supported a new factual allegation and addressing the variance issue.
- The appellate court held the State’s burden was met by a preponderance of the evidence and did not find reversible error in the date discrepancy or in collateral estoppel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the evidence sufficient to adjudicate Dix’s guilt for a violation of community supervision? | Dix | State relied on no-contact video from July 2013. | Yes; sufficient evidence supports the new violation. |
| Does collateral estoppel bar the State from relitigating certain facts? | Dix | Collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of same acts. | Not reached on issue; court affirms on sufficiency without addressing collateral estoppel. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (standard for proving violation of community supervision; preponderance standard applies to revocation)
- Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (preponderance standard governs revocation sufficiency review)
- Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (revocation due process less stringent than trial; focus on notice and right to defense)
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (variance between charging instrument and evidence; material variance required for reversal)
- Santana v. State, 59 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (burden on defendant to show surprise or prejudice from variance)
- Labelle v. State, 720 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (motion for revocation sufficient if it informs defendant of alleged violation)
- Champion v. State, 590 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (motion need not meet indictment-level specifics; fair notice sufficient)
- Spruill v. State, 382 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) (variance and notice considerations in revocation cases)