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Division of Family Services v. O'Bryan
164 A.3d 58
| Del. | 2017
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Background

  • Mark O’Bryan is a Tier II sex offender who lived with his wife and their children; DFS ordered him to leave the family home after a domestic altercation in which children were present.
  • O’Bryan petitioned the Family Court to return home; Family Court issued ex parte relief and held a hearing where DFS conceded no evidence of harm to the children beyond witnessing the fight.
  • O’Bryan acknowledged he had not completed required sex-offender therapy and therefore could not satisfy the statutory rebuttable-presumption conditions if the statute applied.
  • Family Court ruled 13 Del. C. § 724A (the Sex Offenders Act) creates a rebuttable presumption that applies only in Family Court custody proceedings and does not authorize DFS to remove a parent from an intact family home absent a custody petition or other statutory basis.
  • DFS appealed, arguing that § 724A’s residency clause independently prohibits any child from residing with a Tier II/III sex offender absent statutory rebuttal; the Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretation de novo.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (O’Bryan) Defendant's Argument (DFS) Held
Whether § 724A’s rebuttable presumption applies outside Family Court custody proceedings § 724A operates only in pending Family Court custody/residency/visitation proceedings; no petition = no presumption to rebut The statute’s residency clause stands alone and authorizes DFS to bar a sex offender from residing with children until he rebuts the presumption The presumption applies only in Family Court custody proceedings; DFS lacked statutory authority to remove O’Bryan from the home
Whether § 724A authorizes DFS to remove a parent from an intact family home absent other statutory triggers Removal requires a custody petition or other statutory basis (e.g., emergency custody standards or § 724A(d) circumstances) § 724A’s plain language ("no child shall primarily reside with a sex offender") grants DFS authority to act independently § 724A does not provide DFS authority to remove a parent from an intact home; DFS could pursue custody under other chapters (with different burdens)

Key Cases Cited

  • Cordero v. Gulfstream Dev. Corp., 56 A.3d 1030 (Del. 2012) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
  • Terex Corp. v. S. Track & Pump, 117 A.3d 537 (Del. 2015) (statutory provisions must be read holistically)
  • United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (a provision ambiguous in isolation can be clarified by broader statutory context)
  • Zambrana v. State, 118 A.3d 773 (Del. 2015) (statutes construed to effectuate legislative purpose and avoid absurd results)
  • Batch v. Anderson, 47 A.3d 971 (Del. 2012) (distinction between legal custody and residential custody in Family Court)
  • Ross v. Ross, 992 A.2d 1237 (Del. 2010) (residency and custody concepts in family law proceedings)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Division of Family Services v. O'Bryan
Court Name: Supreme Court of Delaware
Date Published: May 31, 2017
Citation: 164 A.3d 58
Docket Number: 175, 2016
Court Abbreviation: Del.