40 A.3d 917
D.C.2012Background
- Bryant, a DC DOC employee, alleged sexual and racial discrimination under the DCHRA beginning in the 1980s.
- OHR found probable cause in 1992 and awarded back pay and retroactive promotion but denied damages for emotional distress and attorney’s fees.
- Subsequent reviews by OCA and Superior Court shifted/remanded several times; back pay and retroactive promotions were adjusted over years.
- In 2007 OHR denied interest on the back pay award, citing lack of statutory/regulatory authority to award interest.
- The Superior Court partially reversed, granting interest on back pay; the case was remanded to OHR for reconsideration of interest under §120.1.
- The DC Court of Appeals held OHR has authority to award interest on back pay, remanding for careful calculation and rationale.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to award interest on back pay | Bryant argues OHR lacked authority to award interest. | DOC/OHR maintain no statutory basis for interest on back pay. | OHR has authority to award interest and remand for calculation. |
| Standard of review for agency statutory interpretation | Defer to OHR on statutory interpretation. | Court should defer to agency construction of its regulations. | Court reviews de novo on pure legal questions; deference not required when agency misinterprets language. |
| Interpretation of 4 DCMR § 120.1 scope | §120.1 does not expressly authorize interest; thus none should be awarded. | Regulation authorizes remedial actions including back pay; interest may be allowed as part of compensation. | §120.1 does not preclude interest; agency interpretation flawed; interest authorized. |
| Remand guidance for interest award | Interest should be awarded at a set rate as part of back pay. | Interest should be determined within statutory framework and case-specific merits. | Remand to OHR to determine and justify interest award, with rate aligned to statutory requirements and remedial purpose. |
Key Cases Cited
- Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (U.S. 1988) (interest may follow back pay where authorized by statute; no express preclusion)
- Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847 (D.C. 1994) (remedies not clearly broadened beyond enumerated; context for statutory authority)
- Burke v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, 26 A.3d 292 (D.C. 2011) (agency interpretation must be reasonable; authority to award interest discussed)
- Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 698 A.2d 430 (D.C. 1997) (deference to agency interpretation when language/purpose unclear)
- 1303 Clifton St., LLC v. District of Columbia, 39 A.3d 25 (D.C. 2012) (requires reasoned explanation for agency interpretation)
- Smith v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 548 A.2d 95 (D.C. 1988) (deferral to agency interpretation generally; consistent with framework)
- United States Parole Comm’n v. Noble, 693 A.2d 1084 (D.C. 1997) (agency expertise governs statutory construction when appropriate)